United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING CONTINUANCE AND STAY
S. Lasnik United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court on defendant's
“Declaration of Daniel Anthony Nix and Third Motion for
Enlargement of Time to File Dispositive Motions and Motion to
Reset Trial Date.” Dkt. # 102.
Court has noted in previous orders, defendant was originally
charged on April 5, 2017, Dkt. # 1, and trial was set for
June 26, 2017, Dkt. # 13. In the fifteen months since then,
the Court has continued trial four different times, largely
due to a series of uncooperative and obstructive tactics by
the defendant. These have included: refusing to engage
proceedings because he “d[id] not consent to being
surety for the defendant, ” Dkt. # 103 at 5; claiming
he is not the person named in the indictment, Dkt. # 104 at
5; claiming he faces different criminal liability than his
identity's “juridical person, ” Dkt. # 103 at
2-4; and limiting his participation to recitations of the
Lord's Prayer, id. at 4-5; see Matthew
6:9-13 (King James). In addition, defendant refused to work
with a succession of attorneys appointed to represent him,
but he also claimed it was impossible for him to find an
attorney who was suitable. The exhaustion of these options
finally led the Court to find that defendant would proceed
pro se because he had, by his conduct, waived his
right to counsel. Dkt. # 74; see United States v.
Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2007). As a
fallback, the Court appointed a fourth attorney, whom
defendant could choose to represent him, consult as standby
counsel, or ignore if he wished. Dkt. # 74.
this month, defendant filed a motion to continue. Dkt. # 93.
The Court denied a continuance, but granted defendant's
request for an extension of the pretrial motions deadline.
Dkt. # 100. Defendant again seeks a fifth continuance, this
time for six months, or in the alternative a stay so he can
petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus. Whether
to grant a continuance is a matter within the Court's
discretion and depends on the defendant's diligence, the
usefulness of a continuance, the inconvenience of additional
delay, and a denial's potential prejudice to the
defendant. United States v. Zamora-Hernandez, 222
F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). In particular, postponements
close to trial are disfavored given the increased
inconvenience of resetting trial at such a late stage and the
potential that those tactics are done for delay. See
United States v. Cook, 487 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir.
1973); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11
(1983) (“[The burden of] assembling the witnesses,
lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time . . .
counsels against continuances except for compelling
defendant presents nothing to change the Court's previous
determination that a continuance is not warranted. Defendant
has had ample time to prepare for trial and review discovery.
Defendant has not shown diligence. Much of the discovery
materials he seeks more time to review were available for
months with the attorneys he refused to engage. Defendant
does not show why another continuance would be useful given
this case's history, but it would be yet another
inconvenience to resolving this matter. Defendant likewise
fails to show how a denial will prejudice him or that
potential prejudice would outweigh the factors strongly
weighing against another continuance. What is more,
defendant's latest motion comes in the context of a
pattern of tactics that reveal a refusal to engage in this
process in good faith.
claims there is exculpatory evidence, including “the
IRS Master Files, ” in addition to the comprehensive
discovery the government has provided. The government is of
course subject to ongoing statutory and constitutional duties
to disclose certain information, see Fed. R. Crim.
P. 16, 26.2; 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 104 (1963), but defendant does
not sufficiently show there is particular undisclosed
evidence that is material to his defense, see United
States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984);
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
the Court declines to stay these proceedings pending an
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Defendant has not
filed an appeal, and it is not clear there would be
jurisdiction for one until there is a final judgment in this
case. See United States v. Pace, 201 F.3d 1116, 1119
(9th Cir. 2000).
foregoing reasons, defendant's motion, Dkt. # 102, is
 A “juridical person”
refers to a nonhuman legal entity, like a corporation.
SeePerson, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The Court is not aware of
any authority creating different individual criminal
liability on this basis, nor has ...