United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
S. ZILLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Thomas S. Zilly Plaintiff, Philips Oral Healthcare, LLC
(“Philips”) sued the named Defendants for
trademark infringement and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.,
Washington state law, and common law. Due to Defendants'
default, the Court takes as true the well-pleaded facts in
Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court now orders the entry of
default judgment and a permanent injunction. This judgment
and permanent injunction are effective only as to the named
parties in this action.
filed this action on July 13, 2018, for trademark
infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., Washington state law,
and common law. Complaint, docket no. 1. Philips completed
service on each of the named defendants listed below (the
“Defaulting Defendants”) in accordance with the
Court's order authorizing electronic service. Order,
docket no. 21.
• Shenzhen Sincere Mold Technology Co., Ltd
• Shenzhen Vbatty Technology Co., Ltd (“Vbatty
• Shenzhen High Sida Technology Co., Ltd (“High
• Shenzhen Hershelly Technology Co., Ltd.
(“Hershelly Technology”); and
• Zhongshan BestClean Brush Co., Ltd
of Service, docket nos. 22-26; Declaration of Laura
McClafferty in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default
Judgment and Permanent Injunction (“McClafferty
Decl.”), docket no. 33, ¶¶ 3-6, 12-16, 21-23,
December 13, 2018, the Clerk entered default against the
Defaulting Defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a), as such
defendants failed to plead or otherwise defend against the
allegations in the Complaint. Order, docket no. 29.
offers a variety of oral health care products, including
replacement toothbrush heads, electric toothbrushes, brush
charging docks, and brush cases, under its SONICARE brand.
Complaint, docket no. 1, ¶ 12. One of Philips'
toothbrush heads within its SONICARE product line is the
SimplyClean replacement toothbrush head. Id.
purports to own common law trademark product configuration
rights in the overall appearance of its SimplyClean
toothbrush head (the “SimplyClean Trademark Product
Configuration”). Id. ¶ 13.
SimplyClean Trademark Product Configuration has been used for
brush heads sold by Philips since at least 2007. Id.
¶ 15. Philips originally sold those brush heads only
under the name ProResults. Id. After 2014, Philips
sold, and continues to sell, those brush heads under the
names SimplyClean and ProResults, differing only by the
bristle colors. Id.
to Defendants' infringing activities, and for over ten
years, Philips alleges that it has has promoted and sold
replacement toothbrush heads comprising the SimplyClean
Trademark Product Configuration. Id. ¶ 16.
Philips claims that it has exclusively used the SimplyClean
Trademark Product Configuration continuously and extensively
in interstate commerce, including in Washington. Id.
to Philips, since 2012 U.S. customers purchased over 30
million units of Philips toothbrush heads comprising the
SimplyClean Trademark Product Configuration, with more being
exposed to the SimplyClean configured toothbrush head through
advertising and promotion. Id. ¶ 17. During
that same time, sales of Philips toothbrush heads comprising
the SimplyClean Trademark Product Configuration generated
revenue exceeding $130 million dollars. Id.
alleges that it has invested substantial resources and money
in promoting its toothbrush heads comprising the SimplyClean
Trademark Product Configuration through various media
outlets, including the Internet. Id. ¶ 18. The
SimplyClean Trademark Product Configuration has been and
continues to be publicized throughout the U.S. Id.
purposes of this litigation, the Court takes as true
Philips' allegation that Philips' SimplyClean
replacement brush heads have a unique and distinctive design.
Id. ¶ 14.
claims that the Defaulting Defendants, without any
authorization or license from Philips, knowingly and
willfully used, and continue to use, the SimplyClean
Trademark Product Configuration in connection with the
manufacturing, advertising, offering for sale, and sale of
infringing replacement toothbrush heads in the U.S. and
Washington over the Internet. Id. ¶ 20. Each
Defaulting Defendant has manufactured and then sold and
shipped infringing products into this Judicial District.
to Philips, the Defaulting Defendants facilitate infringing
sales by designing their websites and/or marketplace listings
so that they appear to potential purchasers to be authorized
high-volume manufacturers and distributors of genuine Philips
products. Id. ¶ 21. All the Defaulting
Defendants' ship to Washington and sell to purchasers in
Washington and the U.S. generally. Id. ¶ 22.
Most of the Defaulting Defendants do not list addresses on
their websites and/or marketplace listings. Id.
¶ 23. To the extent addresses are listed, those
addresses appear to be inaccurate, inconsistent, or
has alleged that the Defaulting Defendants are knowingly and
willfully manufacturing, importing, distributing, offering
for sale, and/or selling large quantities of replacement
toothbrush heads comprising the SimplyClean Trademark Product
Configuration beginning long after Philips first sold
toothbrush heads in the same configuration. Philips further
alleges that Defaulting Defendants' use of a copy of the
SimplyClean Trademark Product Configuration has caused and is
likely to cause confusion; has damaged Philips, its
reputation, as well as the goodwill in and value of the
SimplyClean Trademark Product Configuration; and gives the
Defaulting Defendants an unfair competitive advantage.
the Defaulting Defendants failed to answer Philips'
Complaint, the facts alleged by Philips are deemed admitted
for purposes of this litigation. See Getty Images (US),
Inc. v. Virtual Clinics, No. C13-0626JLR, 2014 WL
358412, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2014) (“At the
default judgment stage, well-pleaded factual allegations,
except those related to damages, are considered admitted and
are sufficient to establish a defendant's
liability.”) (citing Geddes v. United Fin.
Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338, and 1367, since the core
of Philips' claims arise under federal law. See
Complaint, docket no. 1, ¶ 10 (“This action arises
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et
has personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has been
served in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. See Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132, 1135
(9th Cir. 2009). If a party receives adequate notice of the
complaint, “Rule 4 is to be liberally construed to
uphold service.” Id. (internal quotation marks
jurisdiction, whether general or specific, must also comport
with due process. Vosk Int'l Co. v. Zao Gruppa
Predpriyatij Ost, No. C11-1488RSL, 2012 WL 1033535, at
*4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2012). Absent an applicable federal
statutory basis for jurisdiction, a federal court must apply
the personal jurisdiction laws of the state in which it sits.
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). As “Washington's
long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the limits of
federal due process, ” a court has jurisdiction so long
as defendants have sufficient “minimum contacts with
the forum state such that the assertion of jurisdiction does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Vosk Int'l. Co., 2012 WL
1033535, at *4 (citations and internal quotation marks
The Court Has Specific Jurisdiction over the
The Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong test to determine
whether a non-resident defendant is subject to specific
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct
his activities or consummate some transaction with the
forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by
which he purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the
claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the
exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. Stores,
Inc., 826 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (citing
Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d
1218, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schwarzenegger v.
Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.
2004))). Philips has alleged facts-deemed admitted by the
Defaulting Defendants- sufficient to establish personal