United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
S. Lasnik United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court on four motions to dismiss,
filed by defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, as Trustee FKA the
Chase Manhattan Bank Successor in Interest in the Chase
Manhattan Bank N.A. (“Chase”), The Bank of New
York Mellon Trust Company, National Association FKA The Bank
of New York Trust Company, N.A. as Successor to JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. as Trustee for Residential Asset Mortgage
Products, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2005-RP3 (“BONY”), Paul
Savitsky, as Vice President of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
Cody Weston and Joshua Schaer, see Dkt. #15, by
Christopher Luhrs, see Dkt. #17, by Steven K.
Linkon, see Dkt. #27, and by Janaya Carter,
see Dkt. #32.
Huy Ying Chen and Yueh Hua Chen obtained a loan from Washington
Mutual Bank in 1999 to purchase property located at 5112
189th Avenue NE, Redmond, WA 98052 (“the
Property”). Ex. 1, Dkt. #16 at 7; see Dkt.
#1 at ¶¶ 11, 14-17; see Exs. A-C, Dkt. #1
at 29-36. Plaintiffs failed to make several of their monthly
payments. Dkt. #15 at 3. In 2006, Chase initiated a judicial
foreclosure action in the King County Superior Court.
Id. On March 19, 2007, plaintiffs filed a Chapter 11
Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Washington. Id.; see
Ex. 2, Dkt. #1 at 14. On April 13, 2007, they removed the
judicial foreclosure action to the Bankruptcy Court as an
adversary proceeding. Id.; see Ex. 2, Dkt.
#16 at 18. Chase argued before the Bankruptcy Court that the
entire unpaid balance was due, and that foreclosure was
necessary. Id. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Chase on November 29, 2007. It ordered
that Chase was owed $647, 476.68 and could proceed with the
foreclosure sale. Id. at 3-4; see Ex. 3,
Dkt. #16 at 39-45. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on
December 10, 2007 and requested a stay on the foreclosure
proceeding pending the appeal. Id. at 4,
see Ex. 4, Dkt. #16 at 47-49. On March 20, 2008,
this Court denied plaintiffs' request for a stay on the
foreclosure proceeding and allowed Chase to proceed with the
sale of the Property. Ex. 1, Dkt. #16 at 6-7.
filed the Bankruptcy Court's judgment as a foreign
judgment in the King County Superior Court on April 18, 2008,
see Ex. 5, Dkt. #16 at 51-52, and obtained a Writ
for Order of Sale for the Property on October 2, 2008. Ex. 6,
Dkt. #16 at 62-65. The Writ was returned by the King County
Sheriff on January 2, 2009. Ex. 7, Dkt. #16 at 67-68. A new
Order of Sale was issued on October 20, 2016, see
Ex. 9, Dkt. #16 at 82-84, and the Sheriff was instructed to
carry out the Order of Sale. Ex. 10, Dkt. #16 at 86-92. A
Sheriff's Levy on Real Property was recorded with the
King County Auditor on October 24, 2016. Ex. 11, Dkt. #16 at
filed a “Motion to Dismiss a Wrongful Judicial
Foreclosure and Sheriff Sale in Shortening Time” before
the King County Superior Court on December 12, 2016. Ex. 12,
Dkt. #16 at 100-124. This was denied on December 15, 2016.
Ex. 13, Dkt. #16 at 126. The Property was sold on December
16, 2016. Ex. 14, Dkt. #16 at 128-131. Plaintiffs then filed
an “Objection to Confirmation of Sheriff's Sale of
Real Property” on January 12, 2017, see Ex.
15, Dkt. #16 at 133-144, which was also denied on February 1,
2017. Ex. 16, Dkt. #16 at 146-47. On December 11, 2017,
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of
Washington, Division One. Ex. 17, Dkt. #16 at 149-165. They
argued that Chase did not have “standing” for the
foreclosure, that Chase had violated RCW 6.21.030(1)(a)
(providing for notice to be served by a judgment creditor on
a judgment debtor) and RCW 6.21.030(1)(c) (providing for the
filing of an affidavit of compliance that the judgment
creditor has complied with the notice requirements), and that
the Bankruptcy Court's judgment on April 18, 2008 was
void and unenforceable. Id. at 153-54. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's decision on October
8, 2018. Ex. 19, Dkt. #16 at 173-78. It rejected
plaintiffs' argument that Chase did not have standing for
a judicial foreclosure and found that Chase did provide
adequate notice to plaintiffs. Id. at 175-77. It
held that plaintiffs had failed to show any
“substantial irregularities in the proceedings”
and that the Bankruptcy Court's judgment was enforceable.
Id. at 177. The King County Superior Court also
issued an order confirming the sheriff's sale in favor of
BONY on February 1, 2018. Ex. 18, Dkt. #16 at 167-69.
filed this complaint against defendants on August 27, 2018.
They brought claims for lack of standing to foreclose, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, quiet title,
slander of title, and declaratory relief. Dkt. #1 at ¶
24. They alleged that this Court has diversity jurisdiction
over their action. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. They
stated that they reside in Washington, that Chase and BONY
are non-registered entities, that defendant Savitsky resides
in New York, that defendant Weston resides in Oregon, and
that defendants Linkon, Carter, Luhrs, Weston and Schaer
reside in Washington. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4-9.
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503
U.S. 131, 136-137 (1992)). Federal district courts have
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A case
‘arises under' federal law within the meaning of
§ 1331 … if ‘a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question
of federal law.'” Proctor v. Vishay
Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1219 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689-90 (2006)). A federal court
may exercise federal-question jurisdiction if a
“federal right or immunity is an element, and an
essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action
… [and] if a state-law claim necessarily raises a
stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,
which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally-approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.” Provincial Gov't of
Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1086
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations, quotation marks and
courts also have “original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75, 000” and is between citizens of different
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There must be “complete
diversity of citizenship between the parties opposed in
interest.” Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d
1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted).
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject
matter jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at
377 (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-183 (1936)).
fail to raise a federal question in their complaint. Dkt. #1
at ¶¶ 29-93. No. federal right or immunity is an
element of any of their causes of action,  and none of their
state-law claims raise a stated federal issue. Provincial
Gov't of Marinduque, 582 F.3d at 1086. Nor do
plaintiffs have complete diversity with all defendants.
Kuntz, 385 F.3d at 1181. They alleged in their
complaint and their responses that they and defendants
Linkon, Carter, Luhrs and Schaer reside in Washington.
See Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 1-9; Dkt. #34 at 5; Dkt.
#36 at 5-6; Dkt. #39 at 5-6; Dkt. #40 at 5-6. As the Court
finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
action, it does not reach the remainder of defendants'
the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss,
see Dkts. #15, #17, #27, #32, are ...