United States District Court, E.D. Washington
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONFORSUMMARY
JUDGMENTANDGRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONFOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT
ECF Nos. 16, 17
K. DIMKE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment. ECF Nos. 16, 17. The parties consented to proceed
before a magistrate judge. ECF No. 4. The Court, having
reviewed the administrative record and the parties'
briefing, is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below,
the Court denies Plaintiff's motion, ECF No. 16, and
grants Defendant's motion, ECF No. 17.
Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
district court's review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is
limited; the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed
“only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or
is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698
F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial
evidence” means “relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and
citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence
equates to “more than a mere scintilla[, ] but less
than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has
been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire
record as a whole rather than searching for supporting
evidence in isolation. Id.
reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must
uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by
inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
2012). Further, a district court “may not reverse an
ALJ's decision on account of an error that is
harmless.” Id. An error is harmless
“where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's]
ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at
1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing
the ALJ's decision generally bears the burden of
establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v.
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered
“disabled” within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second,
the claimant's impairment must be “of such severity
that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work[, ]
but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C.
Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis
to determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the
Commissioner considers the claimant's work activity. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged
in “substantial gainful activity, ” the
Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
analysis proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner
considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers
from “any impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities, ” the analysis proceeds to
step three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the
claimant's impairment does not satisfy this severity
threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the
claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
three, the Commissioner compares the claimant's
impairment to severe impairments recognized by the
Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from
engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more
severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the
Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
severity of the claimant's impairment does not meet or
exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the
Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant's
“residual functional capacity.” Residual
functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the
claimant's ability to perform physical and mental work
activities on a sustained basis despite her limitations, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth
and fifth steps of the analysis.
four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the
claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing
work that she performed in the past (past relevant work). 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable
of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find
that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such
work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the
claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing
other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the
Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as
the claimant's age, education, and past work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant
is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must
find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting
to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the
claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four
above. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th
Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to establish that 1) the claimant
is capable of performing other work; and 2) such work
“exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2); Beltran
v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
September 11, 2014, Plaintiff applied for Title II disability
insurance benefits alleging an amended disability onset date
of October 28, 2008. Tr. 44, 246-48. The application was
denied initially, Tr. 118-124, and on reconsideration, Tr.
126-30. Plaintiff appeared before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) on November 30, 2016. Tr. 40-100. On June 9, 2017, the
ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim. Tr. 12-32.
one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
from her October 28, 2008 alleged onset date through her date
of last insured of June 30, 2010. Tr. 17. At step two, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments
during the relevant period: mild degenerative disc disease of
the lumbar spine; status-post right shoulder rotator cuff
repair; osteoarthritis of the knees, bilaterally; status-post
arthroscopic surgery on the right; and obesity. Tr. 18.
three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 20. The ALJ then
concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work
with the following limitations:
She could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and up to 10
pounds frequently. She could stand and walk for a total of 6
hours in an 8-hour workday and sit for up to 6 hours in an
8-hour workday with normal breaks. She had the ability to
reach overhead with the right upper extremity on an
occasional basis. She ...