Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma

May 14, 2019

ERIC KLOPMAN-BAERSELMAN, as Personal Representative for the Estate of RUEID KLOPMAN-BAERSELMAN, deceased, Plaintiffs,
v.
AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION; et al.,

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT VIKING PUMP INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

          ROBERT J. BRYAN, United States District Judge.

         This matter comes before the Court on the Viking Pump, Inc.'s (“Viking”) Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 206. The Court has reviewed the pleadings filed regarding the motion and the remaining record.

         For the reasons stated below, Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 206) should be granted.

         I. BACKGROUND

         The above-entitled action was commenced in Pierce County, Washington Superior Court on October 27, 2017. Dkt. 1, at 2. The Notice of Removal was filed with this Court on July 3, 2018. Id.

         In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Klopman-Baerselman was exposed to asbestos while working as a merchant marine and through personal automotive exposure. Dkt. 168, at 5-6. The Plaintiffs claim liability based on theories of product liability, including negligence, strict product liability, conspiracy, and premises liability. Id., at 6-13. Mr. Klopman-Baerselman passed away from mesothelioma on November 25, 2017. Id., at 4.

         Viking now moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, arguing that there is no evidence to support any of Plaintiffs' claims against it. Dkt. 206-1.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

         Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt.”). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Association, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

         The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at trial - e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, T.W. Elect. Service Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W. Elect. Service Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, supra). Conclusory, non-specific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and “missing facts” will not be “presumed.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).

         B. WASHINGTON STATE SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIES

         Under the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).

         C. SUMMARY ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.