United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ERIC KLOPMAN-BAERSELMAN, as Personal Representative for the Estate of RUEID KLOPMAN-BAERSELMAN, deceased, Plaintiffs,
AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION; et al.,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT VIKING PUMP INC.'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
J. BRYAN, United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court on the Viking Pump, Inc.'s
(“Viking”) Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 206.
The Court has reviewed the pleadings filed regarding the
motion and the remaining record.
reasons stated below, Viking's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 206) should be granted.
above-entitled action was commenced in Pierce County,
Washington Superior Court on October 27, 2017. Dkt. 1, at 2.
The Notice of Removal was filed with this Court on July 3,
Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
Klopman-Baerselman was exposed to asbestos while working as a
merchant marine and through personal automotive exposure.
Dkt. 168, at 5-6. The Plaintiffs claim liability based on
theories of product liability, including negligence, strict
product liability, conspiracy, and premises liability.
Id., at 6-13. Mr. Klopman-Baerselman passed away
from mesothelioma on November 25, 2017. Id., at 4.
now moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56,
arguing that there is no evidence to support any of
Plaintiffs' claims against it. Dkt. 206-1.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the
case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985).
There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative
evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt.”).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Conversely, a
genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute,
requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions
of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service Inc. v. Pacific
Electrical Contractors Association, 809 F.2d 626, 630
(9th Cir. 1987).
determination of the existence of a material fact is often a
close question. The court must consider the substantive
evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at
trial - e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil
cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, T.W. Elect.
Service Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The court must resolve
any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving
party only when the facts specifically attested by that party
contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party.
The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will
discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the
hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the
claim. T.W. Elect. Service Inc., 809 F.2d at 630
(relying on Anderson, supra). Conclusory,
non-specific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and
“missing facts” will not be
“presumed.” Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).
WASHINGTON STATE SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIES
the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 427 (1996).