United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
Honorable Richard A. Jones, United States District Judge.
Richard A. Jones This matter comes before the Court on
Plaintiff Lewis Larm's (“Plaintiff”) Motion
to Continue Discovery Cutoff and Related Calendared Events
(Dkt. # 29), and Defendant IBEW Local 191's
(“IBEW”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 32).
Both Motions are opposed. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion and
GRANTS IBEW's Motion.
IBEW runs a hiring hall for the dispatch of electricians to
signatory contractors pursuant to the referral rules
contained in the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) between the Union and the Cascade Chapter
of the National Electrical Contractors Association
(“NECA”). Dkt. # 32-2 at 28-31. Generally, IBEW
dispatches members to contracted jobs based on a
“first-in, first-out” basis, with a few
exceptions for foreman name calls, special skills and
abilities, and others. Id. The CBA creates an
Appeals Committee “to consider any complaint of an
employee or applicant for employment” arising out of
the Union's administration of the contractual referral
rules. Id. The “Appeals Committee shall have
the power to make a final and binding decision on any such
was a member of IBEW in 2014. Dkt. # 32-2 at 61. On January
31, 2014, IBEW dispatched a number of contractors to VECA
Electric in Moses Lake, but did not dispatch Plaintiff, who
had superiority over these contractors. Dkt. # 33-2. On May
5, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Dispatch Appeal complaining that
he had been improperly skipped over for a job in violation of
IBEW's policy. Dkt. # 32-2 at 67-68, 85-86. In July 2014,
Plaintiff sent follow-up letters to IBEW and NECA inquiring
about the status of his Dispatch Appeal. Id. at
newly-elected Business Manager, Joe Lorenzo, received the
Dispatch Appeal on August 1, 2014. Dkt. # 32-2 at 92. Mr.
Lorenzo then contacted Plaintiff to discuss the matter, and
“[a]lmost immediately” called Cindy Austin, the
NECA Executive Manager, to inform her of the appeal.
Id. On August 25, 2014, Mr. Lorenzo and Ms. Austin
called Plaintiff to discuss his appeal. Dkt. # 32-2 at 3-4,
94-96. In this call, Mr. Lorenzo and Ms. Austin explained
that because Plaintiff had already taken another contract,
they “could not fix what had happened on January 31st,
” and that they would not give him compensation.
Id. This was the only conversation Plaintiff had
with Mr. Lorenzo and Ms. Austin regarding his Dispatch
Appeal. Id. at 74.
two years passed without further communication or activity.
Dkt. # 32-2 at 74-78. On October 20, 2016, Plaintiff sent a
letter to the Union, inquiring why “I was denied or it
was thought of by those in discussion that I didn't need
or deserve any compensation” for the challenged
dispatch. Id. at 75-76, 89. Plaintiff stated that
the “discussion” that he referenced was the
August 25, 2014 phone call. Id. at 75-76. On October
27, 2016, Mr. Lorenzo responded with a letter, stating that
Plaintiff made the decision in the phone call to drop the
appeal, and that the case was closed. Id. at 90.
January 30, 2017, Plaintiff brought suit against IBEW in
Snohomish County Superior Court under Section 301 of the Fair
Labor Management Relations Act, and for failure to represent.
Dkt. # 1-2 at 3, ¶ 3.1. IBEW removed to this Court. Dkt.
# 1. On January 16, 2018, this Court granted IBEW's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff's lawsuit
was not filed within the applicable federal six-month statute
of limitations. Dkt. # 17 at 3-4. The Court granted Plaintiff
leave to file an amended pleading, which Plaintiff filed on
January 31, 2018. Dkt. # 18. Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint alleges a violation of IBEW's duty of fair
representation “arising out of Section 9(a) of the
NLRA.” Dkt. # 18, ¶ 3.1.
Plaintiff's Motion to Continue (Dkt. # 29)
has moved for a continuance of 45 days to “allow his
attorney the opportunity to take the deposition of
VECA.” Dkt. # 29 at 1. Plaintiff blames the tardiness
of this request on VECA's non-responsiveness to his
previous requests for information, and the workload of
Plaintiff's counsel. Dkt. # 29 at 2.
Court may order such a change “only for good
cause.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4). The Court agrees with
IBEW that grounds identified by Plaintiff do not demonstrate
the good cause necessary to modify the case schedule. Dkt. #
30 at 3. Plaintiff has already been provided multiple
extensions to the discovery cutoff, and has been on notice of
the need to depose VECA for many months. Dkt. ## 25-28.
Moreover, the Court finds that permitting a further extension
for Plaintiff to seek additional information from VECA would
be pointless, as this information is not germane to the
statute of limitations issue that results in the dismissal of
the Court will DENY Plaintiff's request.
Dkt. # 29.
IBEW's Motion for Summary ...