United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
S. LASNIK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration of the Court's order dated April 17, 2019
granting defendants' motions to dismiss. Dkt. #46.
for reconsideration are generally disfavored. LCR 7(h). The
Court will “ordinarily deny such motions in the absence
of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a
showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have
been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable
argue that the Court erred in dismissing their complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. #44. First,
plaintiffs appear to argue that this Court had jurisdiction
over this case as one “arising under the bankruptcy
code of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).” Dkt. #46 at 3, 5.
They also state that the “Washington State Superior
Court [had] no jurisdiction [over] [the] Bankruptcy
Court's monetary judgment.” Id. at 3.
Defendant JPMorgan Chase (“Chase”) initiated a
juridical foreclosure action in the King County Superior
Court in 2006. Dkt. #15 at 3. In 2007, plaintiffs filed a
Chapter 11 Petition, see Ex. 2, Dkt. #1 at 14, and
removed the judicial foreclosure action to the Bankruptcy
Court as an adversary proceeding. Ex. 2, Dkt. #16 at 18. The
Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase
on November 29, 2007. Ex. 3, Dkt. #16 at 39-45. Plaintiffs
filed a Notice of Appeal on December 10, 2007 and requested a
stay on the foreclosure proceeding pending the appeal. Ex. 4,
Dkt. #16 at 47-49. This Court denied plaintiffs' request
for a stay on May 20, 2008. Ex. 1, Dkt. #16 at 6-7. Chase
then filed the Bankruptcy Court's judgment as a foreign
judgment in the King County Superior Court on April 18, 2008
and obtained a Writ for Order of Sale of the Property. Ex. 5,
Dkt. #16 at 51-52. There is nothing amiss in the exercise of
jurisdiction by the King County Superior Court.
complaint does not arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and
does not implicate any bankruptcy issues. See
generally Dkt. #1. It was filed against defendants on
five causes of action, namely, lack of standing to foreclose,
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, quiet
title, slander of title, and declaratory relief. Dkt. #1 at
¶ 24. No. federal right or immunity is an element of any
of plaintiffs' causes of action, and none of their
state-law claims raise a stated federal issue. Provincial
Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d
1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations, quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
plaintiffs appear to argue again that defendants violated 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) by presenting the Bankruptcy Court's
order to the King County Superior Court as a foreign
judgment, because the automatic stay on it was never lifted.
Dkt. #46 at 4, 6. Preliminarily, plaintiffs are incorrect in
their assertion that the Court granted defendants'
motions merely because no reference was made to 11 U.S.C.
§ 362. Id. at 6. The Court explicitly ruled
that the argument would have been unsuccessful even had
plaintiffs raised it, because there was no automatic stay.
Dkt. #44 at 5 n.3. This Court remanded plaintiffs'
appeals to the Bankruptcy Court on April 11, 2008, based on
plaintiffs' indication that “they [had] reached a
settlement with two interested parties.” Ex. B1, Dkt.
#36 at 15-16. The remand was to remain in effect until July
1, 2008. Id. However, at this stage, the Bankruptcy
Court had already granted summary judgment in favor of Chase.
Ex. 3, Dkt. #16 at 39-45. This Court had also specifically
denied plaintiffs' request for a stay on the foreclosure
proceeding pending their appeals. Ex. 1, Dkt. #16 at 6-7.
There was no automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 in
plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in granting
defendants' request for judicial notice. Dkt. #46 at 5.
The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known
within the Court's territorial jurisdiction, or
“can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Plaintiffs are incorrect in their
assertion that the Court “should not, while deciding
one case, take judicial notice of the record of another
independent and separate judicial proceeding, even if is
between the same parties.” Dkt. #46 at 6. To the
contrary, the Court “may take notice of proceedings in
other courts, both within and without the federal judicial
system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to
matters at issue.” Trigueros v. Adams, 658
F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States ex
rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo,
Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)).
the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration is DENIED. DATED.
 Plaintiffs also appear to argue that
Chase and The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, National
Association FKA The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.
(“BONY”) were “factious” entities.
Dkt. $46 at 5. It is not clear what plaintiffs mean. However,
insofar as the entities relate to subject matter
jurisdiction, plaintiffs stated in their complaint that Chase
and BONY were non-registered entities, that defendants Joshua
Schaer, Christopher Luhrs, Steven K. Linkon, Janaya Carter
and possibly Cody Weston (who plaintiffs listed as being
licensed to practice in both Oregon and Washington) resided