Dayman Ali Ingram appeals from his jury trial convictions for
residential burglary (domestic violence) and violation of a
domestic violence court order. He argues that the trial court
erred when it imposed bail and denied him pretrial release
based on personal recognizance and by ruling that the
validity of a foreign protection order is not an element of
the offense of violation of a domestic violence court under
RCW 26.50.110(1)(a). In the published portion of this
opinion, we hold that although the bail issue is moot, we
reach the issue because it is a matter of public importance;
the trial court was not required to enter findings; the trial
court erred by imposing bail without first considering less
restrictive alternatives and Ingram's financial
resources, and the validity of the foreign protection order
is not an element of the offense.
unpublished portion of the opinion, we hold that remand for
reevaluation of several legal financial obligations (LFOs) is
required and do not reach Ingram's pro se ineffective
assistance of counsel claim raised in his statement of
additional grounds (SAG) because that claim involves matters
outside the appellate record. Accordingly, we affirm
Ingram's convictions, but we remand for the trial court
to reexamine the LFOs consistent with this opinion.
November 30, 2016, Tiffany Ingram obtained a restraining
order in Oregon (Oregon order), prohibiting her husband
Ingram from entering or remaining in the area within 150 feet
of her current or future residence. The Oregon order stated
that the addresses of these locations were being withheld for
safety reasons. In another section, the Oregon court struck
additional language that stated, "Stay away from home on
Rossiter, mother[']s on Alder, Sister[']s on Hood pi
[sic] and Grandmother[']s on Riverview." Clerk's
Papers (CP) at 56. Tiffany provided the Oregon court with a
"safe" "[r]esidence/[c]ontact [a]ddress,"
in Portland. CP at 61.
December 1, Tiffany, who had been staying with relatives in
Oregon, returned to the home on Rossiter Lane that she and
Ingram had shared, locked up the home, and turned off the
lights. The next day, she drove past the home and saw that
there were lights on inside. Tiffany called the police. The
police found Ingram inside the home, and Ingram showed them a
copy of the Oregon order. The police arrested Ingram.
Pretrial and Trial Proceedings
State charged Ingram with residential burglary (domestic
violence) and a gross misdemeanor violation of a domestic
violence court order. Ingram pleaded not guilty to the
Assessment and Bail Hearings
was booked into jail on December 2. On December 4, based on
the statement of probable cause, a judge certified that there
was probable cause to arrest Ingram. A court date was set for
December 4 risk assessment, the Clark County Corrections
Release Unit assigned Ingram a "risk score" of
four, which fell between a medium risk (three) and a high
risk (five). The release unit's assessment noted that
Ingram reported that (1) he had lived by himself in
Vancouver, Washington for the past two and a half years, (2)
he had previously lived in Portland, Oregon, (3) he had no
family in Clark County, (4) he had not provided any
references, and (5) he was unemployed. The assessment further
stated that Ingram (1) had a history of escape, (2) was
currently on probation on an Oregon driving-related charge,
(3) had a criminal history, (4) had prior failures to appear
but no bail jump convictions, and (5) had mental health
issues including anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder
and had received prior psychiatric treatment. Based on these
facts and its risk assessment, the release unit recommended
that Ingram be denied release "due to extensive
criminal, [failure to appear], and escape record." CP at
3. On December 4, a judge also issued an order of conditions
for release on bail stating that Ingram was not subject to
bail until a court hearing set for December 5.
Ingram's first appearance on December 5, the State
requested $60, 000 bail. The State justified this request
based on Ingram's prior convictions for unlawful
possession of a firearm in 2007, second degree assault in
1997, second degree burglary in 1997, first degree escape in
1995, first degree robbery in 1994, and second degree robbery
in 2001. The State also commented that Ingram had "six
different cases [in Oregon] that have gone to warrant"
and that he had "prior [failures to appear] on his
cases." 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 5. Defense
counsel, who had just been appointed to Ingram's case and
had just received the statement of probable cause, requested
$5, 000 bail after noting that the no contact order violation
did not involve violence.
trial court set bail at $60, 000 after commenting
that when Tiffany applied for the restraining order, she had
asserted that Ingram "had recently held a gun to her
head." 1 RP at 6. The trial court also stated that it
would reexamine bail at the next hearing. It does not appear
that the trial court entered any written findings related to
the bail decision following the December 5, 2016 hearing. At
no point during the hearing did the trial court discuss any
less restrictive alternatives to bail or Ingram's
December 16,  Ingram was arraigned. He pleaded not
guilty. Although the trial courthad stated at the December
5 hearing that it would reexamine bail at the next hearing,
no one raised any bail issues.
December 21, before a different judge,  Ingram requested
that the court grant him supervised release. After arguing
that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges
because the Oregon order was invalid, Ingram requested that
the trial court amend the bail order and grant him supervised
release because he did not "have the funds to bail
out" and he had a legitimate challenge to the charges. 1
RP at 12. After hearing Ingram's criminal history and
argument from the parties, the judge deferred this decision
to the original trial court judge, effectively denying
Ingram's request for supervised release.
December 28, before the first judge,  Ingram asked for
a bail reduction based on his legal argument that the Oregon
protection order was invalid. The trial court denied this
request. The trial court commented that it had originally set
bail based on "criminal history, failures to appear, and
[the] likelihood of reappearance in court," and that
nothing had changed in relation to those factors. 1 RP at 22.
During this hearing, there was no discussion of Ingram's
financial status or any less restrictive conditions of
release other than release on recognizance.
Validity of Oregon Order
various stages of the pretrial proceedings, the parties
addressed whether the validity of the Oregon order could be
raised before the jury. The trial court ruled that Ingram
could not "challenge the validity of the order in Oregon
in a Washington criminal case" and that validity of the
Oregon order was not an element of the offense. 1 RP at 103
State presented testimony from Tiffany and the officers who
arrested Ingram. Ingram did not call any witnesses. The jury
instructions for the violation of the court order did not
require the jury to find that the Oregon order was valid.
jury found Ingram guilty of residential burglary and
violation of a domestic violence court order. Ingram appeals.
contends that the trial court erred when it set his bail and
refused to release him on his own recognizance and when it
denied his renewed motions to reduce his bail requirement.
Specifically, Ingram argues that the trial court (1) failed
to enter oral or written findings, (2) failed to consider the
factors required in CrR 3.2(c) and (e) and the record does
not support findings under either subsection, (3) failed to
consider less restrictive conditions of release or
Ingram's financial resources before imposing the bail
requirement, and (4) denied him effective assistance of
counsel by not allowing appointed defense counsel time to
prepare for the initial bail hearing.
Matter of Continuing and Substantial Public Interest
first address whether this issue is moot. An issue is moot if
we can no longer provide effective relief. State v.
Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 616, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995). We can
no longer provide effective relief here because Ingram has
been convicted and pretrial bail is no longer available to
however, consider a moot issue if it involves matters of
continuing and substantial public interest. State v.
Cruz, 189 Wn.2d 588, 598, 404 P.3d 70 (2017). In
determining whether a case presents an issue of continuing
and substantial public interest, we consider (1) the public
or private nature of the issue, (2) whether guidance for
public officers on the issue is desirable, and (3) the
likelihood that the issue will recur. Cruz, 189
Wn.2d at 598. We also consider '"the likelihood that
the issue will escape review because the facts of the
controversy are short-lived.'" State v.
Huckins, 5 Wn.App. 2d 457, 463, 426 P.3d 797 (2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Weseterman v.
Cary, 125 Wn.2d277, 286-87, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994)).
have recognized before, the setting of bail is an issue of a
public nature and "there is currently a dearth of
cases" addressing bail issues. Huckins, 5
Wn.App. 2d at 463-64; see also State v. Barton, 181
Wn.2d 148, 152, 331 P.3d 50 (2014) (accepting review of moot
bail case because it was a matter of continuing and
substantial public interest). Deciding this case would
provide a useful reminder to the trial courts of the
requirements of setting bail and release conditions for
criminal defendants-issues that are likely to recur.
Furthermore, "given the time constraints inherent in
criminal cases, the issue might otherwise evade appellate
review." Huckins, 5 Wn. App.2d at 464.
Accordingly, we review Ingram's bail arguments on the
merits because they present matters of continuing and
substantial public interest.
argues that the trial court was required to make
"specific findings under CrR 3.2(a)(1) or (2)" and
that the court failed to comply with this requirement. Br. of
Appellant at 29. He suggests that the absence of specific
findings demonstrates that the trial court ignored the
presumption of release on personal recognizance pending
trial. Ingram fails to establish that oral or written
findings are required, but we review the record to determine
if the trial court considered the relevant factors before
determining whether release on personal recognizance was
appropriate or whether bail was required.
oral or written findings are required is a question of law,
which this court reviews de novo. State v. Hanson,
151 Wn.2d 783, 784-85, 91 P.3d 888 (2004). We apply canons of
statutory interpretation when construing court rules.
State v. Robinson, 153 Wn.2d 689, 692, 107 P.3d 90
(2005). The plain language of a court rule controls when it
is unambiguous. Robinson, 153 Wn.2d at 693.
Any person, other than a person charged with a capital
offense, shall at the preliminary appearance ... be ordered
released on the accused's personal recognizance pending
(1) the court determines that such recognizance will
not reasonably assure the accused's appearance, when
(2) there is shown a likely danger that the accused:
(a) will commit a violent crime, or
(b) will seek to intimidate witnesses, or otherwise
unlawfully interfere with the administration of justice.
In making the determination herein, the court shall, on the
available information, consider the relevant facts
including, but not limited to, those in subsections (c) and
(e) of [CrR 3.2].
(Emphasis added.) CrR 3.2(c) and (e) similarly require only
that the trial court "consider" various factors and
do not expressly require any oral or written findings.
oral or written findings are helpful on appeal, unlike other
rules that clearly require oral or written findings,
 CrR 3.2 does not expressly require
that the trial court enter any oral or written findings. CrR
3.2(a) requires only that the trial court (1)
"determine" whether release on personal
recognizance is insufficient to reasonably assure the
defendant's appearance or protect against harm, and (2)
"consider" the relevant facts. And CrR 3.2(c) and
(e) only require the court to "consider" the
factors. Thus, CrR 3.2 itself does not require oral or
does Ingram cite to any other authority that requires oral or
written findings in this context. Although he cites State
v. Rose, 146 Wn.App. 439, 191 P.3d 83 (2008), for his
assertion that the trial court must "rebut the
presumption of release by making the specific findings under
CrR 3.2(a)(1) or (2), prior to imposing any conditions of
release," Rose did not address whether findings
were required and does not require oral or written findings.
Br. of Appellant at 29. In Rose, we merely examined
the record to determine whether there was a
"determination related to [the defendant's]
unlikeliness to appear" and whether there was any
evidence introduced "that would have supported a trial
court finding that [the defendant] would be unlikely to
appear." 146 Wn.App. at 450 (emphasis added).
oral or written findings are not required by the rule, Ingram
cites no authority requiring the entry of oral or written
findings under CrR 3.2(a), and the trial court made oral
findings at a subsequent hearing, Ingram's argument
Consideration of Factors and Support for Findings
further argues that the record does not show that the trial
court considered the required factors stated in CrR 3.2(c)
and (e). In analyzing this issue, we examine the record to
determine if the record supports a determination that Ingram
would be unlikely to appear or that Ingram was a substantial
danger. Rose, 146 Wn.App. at 446-47, 448-454. Here,
the record supports both determinations.
review a trial court's determination of whether a
defendant is likely to flee and whether a defendant is likely
to pose a substantial danger to the community for abuse of
discretion. State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 505, 527
P.2d 674 (1974). A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision falls outside the range of acceptable choices, its
decision is unsupported by the record, or the court applies
an incorrect legal standard. State v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d
541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).
In determining which conditions of release will reasonably
assure the accused's appearance, the court shall, on the
available information, consider the relevant ...