United States District Court, E.D. Washington
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF Nos. 13, 14
K. DIMKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment. ECF Nos. 13, 14. The undersigned, having reviewed
the administrative record and the parties' briefing, is
fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, IT IS
RECOMMENDED Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 13, be granted
and Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 14, be denied.
Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
district court's review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is
limited; the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed
“only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or
is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698
F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial
evidence” means “relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and
citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence
equates to “more than a mere scintilla[, ] but less
than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has
been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire
record as a whole rather than searching for supporting
evidence in isolation. Id.
reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must
uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by
inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
2012). Further, a district court “may not reverse an
ALJ's decision on account of an error that is
harmless.” Id. An error is harmless
“where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's]
ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at
1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing
the ALJ's decision generally bears the burden of
establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v.
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered
“disabled” within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second,
the claimant's impairment must be “of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work[, ] but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis
to determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step
one, the Commissioner considers the claimant's work
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant
is engaged in “substantial gainful activity, ”
the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
analysis proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner
considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers
from “any impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities, ” the analysis
proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the
claimant's impairment does not satisfy this severity
threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the
claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
three, the Commissioner compares the claimant's
impairment to severe impairments recognized by the
Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from
engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more
severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the
Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
severity of the claimant's impairment does not meet or
exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the
Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant's
“residual functional capacity.” Residual
functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the
claimant's ability to perform physical and mental work
activities on a sustained basis despite his or her
limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), is relevant to
both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.
four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the
claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing
work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant
work). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant
is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner
must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such
work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the
claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing
other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the
Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as
the claimant's age, education and past work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant
is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must
find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting
to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the
claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four
above. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th
Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant
is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work
“exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2); Beltran
v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
February 1, 2016, Plaintiff applied for Title II disability
insurance benefits alleging a disability onset beginning
January 8, 2015. Tr. 151-52. The application was denied
initially, Tr. 89-91, and on reconsideration, Tr. 96-97.
Plaintiff appeared for a hearing before an administrative law
judge (ALJ) on June 22, 2017. Tr. 38-69. On August 9, 2017,
the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim. Tr. 12-30.
one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
during the period from his alleged date of onset of January
8, 2015 through his date last insured of September 30, 2016.
Tr. 17. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: insulin dependent diabetes
mellitus, morbid obesity, knee pain, back pain with minimal
pathology, and osteoarthritis. Tr. 17.
three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 19. The ALJ then
concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary
work but with the following limitations:
[Plaintiff] can stand and walking [sic] fifteen to twenty
minutes at a time. If sitting, he would need the ability to
stand and taking [sic] a one-minute to two minute stretch
period every sixty minutes. He can occasionally perform
postural activities, must never climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds and never crawl. He must avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme temperatures, respiratory irritants, and
must avoid all exposure to hazards.
four, the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past
relevant work. Tr. 23. At step five, the ALJ found that,
considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience,
RFC, and testimony from the vocational expert, there were
jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as: charge account
clerk, printed circuit board assembler, and telephone
information clerk. Tr. 24. Therefore, the ALJ concluded
Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from January 8, 2015, the alleged onset
date, through the date last insured. Tr. 24.
24, 2018, the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's
decision, Tr. 1-6, making the ALJ's decision the
Commissioner's final decision for purposes ...