United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
RICHARD A. JONES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is pro se Plaintiff Madiha Miner's
amended complaint. Dkt. #, 25. The Court also considers all
other outstanding motions in this case. Dkt. ## 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35,
the many dozens of filings made in this matter, the Court has
great difficulty determining the exact nature, scope, and
details of Ms. Miner's claims. She brings this in
forma pauperis (IFP) action against the Issaquah Police
Department for discrimination and malicious harassment, but
many of her allegations have no connection whatsoever to the
Issaquah Police Department's activities. Dkt. ## 6, 25.
For example, Miner alleges that her internet was cyber hacked
following a call from the Social Security Administration.
Dkt. # 25 at 2. She alleges that she was discriminated
against by the King County Housing Authority due to increases
in her rent. Id. She also alleges that her family is
under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
that this District is biased toward her, in part, because
most of her cases were consolidated before Judge Robart.
Id. at 4. She makes similar allegations against
other state and federal entities throughout her complaint.
sparse allegations against the Issaquah Police Department,
Miner claims that her son was approached by an officer while
he worked on his car and asked to show identification.
Id. at 3. In a separate incident, an officer with
Issaquah Police Department approached her son's friend
and asked who owned the vehicle. Id. Lastly, Ms.
Miner claims that her son was racially profiled in Renton
after assaulting an individual who had taken pictures of him
and his friends. Id.
1915(e)(2)(B) of Title 28 authorizes a district court to
dismiss an IFP complaint “at any time” if the
court determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious;
(2) the action fails to state a claim; or (3) the action
seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma
pauperis complaints, not just those filed by
prisoners.”). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks a
basis in law or fact. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d
1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint fails to state a
claim if it does not “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007).
complaint must also comply with the pleading requirements of
Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(1)(2). Although Rule
8's pleading standard does not require “detailed
factual allegations, ” it demands more than “an
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Miner's amended complaint only brings a claim against the
Issaquah Police Department. Her allegations against this
entity are entirely conclusory and thus fail to raise a
“right to relief above the speculative level.”
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Even construing all
allegations in the light most favorable to Miner and giving
due deference to her pro se status, the complaint
fails to “contain sufficient allegations of underlying
facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to
defend itself effectively.” See Starr v. Baca,
652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). As such, the Court
dismisses her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Plaintiff's Outstanding Motions
Miner has filed numerous motions in this matter, many of
which are frivolous, incomprehensible, or not within the
authority of this Court. These include, among others, (1)
motions for move her cases to the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Washington Supreme Court, (2) motions to cease and desist the
federal government from withholding her mail and cyber
hacking her cable and internet, (3) motions to cease and
desist Judge Robart and other court staff from
“responding to all her cases, ” (4) and motions
to reopen cases due to evidence tampering. See Dkt.
# 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.
These filings are largely indecipherable, contain little more
than vague allusions and accusations, and do not require or
deserve further attention by this Court. Therefore, the Court
STRIKES these motions. Furthermore, several
of Plaintiff's motions are moot given the Court's
ruling on her Complaint. These include her motion regarding
service of summons, her motion for judgment, and her motion
for default judgment. See Dkt. ## 10, 18, 26.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES these motions.
last outstanding motion is Plaintiff's motion to appoint
counsel. Dkt. # 21. Generally, a person has no right to
counsel in civil actions. See Storseth v. Spellman,
654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). However, a court may
under “exceptional circumstances” appoint counsel
for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 ...