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Miner v. Issaquah Police Department

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

July 29, 2019

MADIHA MINER, Plaintiff,




         Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Madiha Miner's amended complaint. Dkt. #, 25. The Court also considers all other outstanding motions in this case. Dkt. ## 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.


         Despite the many dozens of filings made in this matter, the Court has great difficulty determining the exact nature, scope, and details of Ms. Miner's claims. She brings this in forma pauperis (IFP) action against the Issaquah Police Department for discrimination and malicious harassment, but many of her allegations have no connection whatsoever to the Issaquah Police Department's activities. Dkt. ## 6, 25. For example, Miner alleges that her internet was cyber hacked following a call from the Social Security Administration. Dkt. # 25 at 2. She alleges that she was discriminated against by the King County Housing Authority due to increases in her rent. Id. She also alleges that her family is under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that this District is biased toward her, in part, because most of her cases were consolidated before Judge Robart. Id. at 4. She makes similar allegations against other state and federal entities throughout her complaint.

         As for sparse allegations against the Issaquah Police Department, Miner claims that her son was approached by an officer while he worked on his car and asked to show identification. Id. at 3. In a separate incident, an officer with Issaquah Police Department approached her son's friend and asked who owned the vehicle. Id. Lastly, Ms. Miner claims that her son was racially profiled in Renton after assaulting an individual who had taken pictures of him and his friends. Id.


         A. IFP Complaint

         Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of Title 28 authorizes a district court to dismiss an IFP complaint “at any time” if the court determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious; (2) the action fails to state a claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.”). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks a basis in law or fact. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007).

         An IFP complaint must also comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(1)(2). Although Rule 8's pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” it demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

         Ms. Miner's amended complaint only brings a claim against the Issaquah Police Department. Her allegations against this entity are entirely conclusory and thus fail to raise a “right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Even construing all allegations in the light most favorable to Miner and giving due deference to her pro se status, the complaint fails to “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). As such, the Court dismisses her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2).

         B. Plaintiff's Outstanding Motions

         Ms. Miner has filed numerous motions in this matter, many of which are frivolous, incomprehensible, or not within the authority of this Court. These include, among others, (1) motions for move her cases to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court, (2) motions to cease and desist the federal government from withholding her mail and cyber hacking her cable and internet, (3) motions to cease and desist Judge Robart and other court staff from “responding to all her cases, ” (4) and motions to reopen cases due to evidence tampering. See Dkt. # 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. These filings are largely indecipherable, contain little more than vague allusions and accusations, and do not require or deserve further attention by this Court. Therefore, the Court STRIKES these motions. Furthermore, several of Plaintiff's motions are moot given the Court's ruling on her Complaint. These include her motion regarding service of summons, her motion for judgment, and her motion for default judgment. See Dkt. ## 10, 18, 26. Accordingly, the Court DENIES these motions.

         The last outstanding motion is Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel. Dkt. # 21. Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions. See Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). However, a court may under “exceptional circumstances” appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 ...

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