United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to
dismiss (Dkt. No. 9). Having thoroughly considered the
parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court
hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion for the
reasons explained herein.
2008, Plaintiff Sara Gahan purchased real property in Mt.
Vernon, Washington (the “Property”) with a loan
in the amount of $248, 391 obtained through Linear Financial.
(Dkt. Nos. 5, 10-1 at 2-25.) That loan was subsequently
assigned to Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Dkt. No. 10-1
at 26.) In 2010, a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the
Property was recorded, and two years later, a Notice of
Discontinuance of Trustee's Sale was recorded.
(Id. at 28-33.) In March 2012, Plaintiff entered a
loan modification agreement with Defendant, which stated that
the new principal balance of Plaintiff's loan was $266,
153.88. (Id. at 35-40; Dkt. No. 5 at 3.)
February 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant
stating that her loan was in default. (Id. at 4.) In
mid-2017 and early 2018, Plaintiff alleges that she received
a series of letters from “Home Preservation Specialist
Omolarah Hasan” insinuating that Plaintiff was under
review for a loan modification (Id.) These letters
confused Plaintiff because she believed she was already in a
loan modification program. (Id. at 4-5.) By early
2018, Plaintiff would have been in the loan modification
program for nearly six years. Plaintiff alleges that she had
been making a $1, 300.15 monthly payment for over two years.
(Id. at 5.)
February 2018, Plaintiff received a letter stating that
Defendant would commence foreclosure proceedings on the
Property unless she paid $232, 388.45. (Id. at 5.)
In March 2018, a second Notice of Trustee's Sale of the
Property was recorded, and on June 12, 2018, a Notice of
Discontinuance of Trustee's Sale was recorded. (Dkt. No.
10-1 at 42-47.) In June 2018, Plaintiff sold her home and
Defendant received $240, 550.25 of the sale proceeds.
(Id. at 49-57; Dkt. No. 5 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges
that she was not credited for the loan modification payments
that she made for over two years. (Id. at 5.)
Conversely, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff stopped making
payments on her loan in August 2017, which is why Defendant
planned to commence foreclosure proceedings. (See
Dkt. No. 9 at 7.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, bringing a
breach of contract claim and a claim for violation of the
Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”).
(Id. at 3, 5-6.) Defendant moves to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim. (Dkt.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Legal
Court may dismiss a complaint that “fail[s] to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. at 678.
plaintiff is obligated to provide grounds for his or her
entitlement to relief that amount to more than labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
asks the Court to take judicial notice of the following
documents: (1) a promissory note dated April 14, 2008,
executed by Plaintiff (“Exhibit 1”); (2) a deed
of trust dated April 14, 2008, executed by Plaintiff and her
husband, Jason Gahan, recorded April 16, 2008 (“Exhibit
2”); (3) an assignment of the April 14, 2008 deed of
trust to Defendant, executed by Plaintiff, recorded on April
23, 2008 (“Exhibit 3”); (4) a Notice of
Trustee's Sale dated September 7, 2010, recorded on
September 9, 2010 (“Exhibit 4”); (5) a Notice of
Discontinuance of Trustee's Sale dated March 20, 2012,
recorded on March 22, 2012 (“Exhibit 5”); (6) a
loan modification agreement entered between Plaintiff and
Defendant, dated February 29, 2012 (“Exhibit 6”);
(7) a Notice of Trustee's Sale dated March 23, 2018,
recorded on March 27, 2018 (“Exhibit 7”); (8) a
Notice of Discontinuance of Trustee's Sale dated June 12,
2018, recorded on June 14, 2018 (“Exhibit 8”);
(9) a statutory warranty deed dated May 29, 2018, executed by
Plaintiff and Jason Gahan, recorded on June 6, 2018
(“Exhibit 9”); (10) a deed of reconveyance dated
June 14, 2018, recorded July 23, 2018 (“Exhibit
10”); and (11) a real estate tax affidavit executed by
Plaintiff and Jason Gahan on June 5, 2018 (“Exhibit
11”). (See Dkt. No. 10.)
the Court may not consider material outside of the pleadings
when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lee v. City of Los
Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). There are
two exceptions to this rule. First, the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine allows the Court to treat
certain documents as though they are part of the complaint
itself. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A] court may consider
evidence on which the complaint necessarily relies if: (1)
the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is
central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party
questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the
12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ.
Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Second,
the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of facts that
are “not subject to reasonable dispute.”
Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). One way that a fact is not subject to
reasonable dispute is if it “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).
exhibit except for Exhibits 1 and 6 are subject to judicial
notice because they are official public records that can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(2); Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas
Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).
Exhibits 1 and 6 are subject to judicial notice via the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Plaintiff's
complaint refers to both her initial purchase of the Property
and the loan modification agreement. (Dkt. No. 5.) Both of
these documents are central to Plaintiff's claim because
the crux of her complaint is that she made payments, in
compliance with the requirements of her note and subsequent
loan modification agreement, and was never credited ...