McLaughlin appeals the trial court's dismissal of his
lawsuit against his insurer, Travelers Commercial Insurance
Company. McLaughlin was injured after he struck an open car
door while riding his bicycle. McLaughlin's personal
injury protection (PIP) policy covers injuries to a
"pedestrian" but does not define that term. Because
we must give an undefined term in an insurance policy its
plain, ordinary, and common meaning and because the
dictionary definition of "pedestrian" excludes
bicyclists, we hold that McLaughlin was not a pedestrian at
the time of his injury and therefore not entitled to PIP
benefits. Additionally, we reject McLaughlin's contention
that a definition of "pedestrian" in
Washington's Insurance Code, Title 48 RCW, requires that
a bicyclist is a pedestrian under his policy. Accordingly, we
31, 2017, McLaughlin was injured while riding his bicycle on
Westlake Avenue in Seattle. Daniel Moore, who was parked on
the street, did not see McLaughlin approach and opened his
driver's side door, striking McLaughlin.
time of the accident, McLaughlin was covered by a California
Personal Auto policy from Travelers. The policy provided PIP
benefits of up to $5, 000 in medical expenses sustained by an
"insured." The term "insured" was defined
in relevant part as "a pedestrian when struck by" a
motor vehicle. The term "pedestrian" was not
sought coverage for his medical expenses under the policy.
Travelers denied coverage, finding that McLaughlin was not a
pedestrian because he was riding his bicycle at the time of
the accident. McLaughlin sued Travelers for breach of
contract and other related theories based on its denial of
coverage. Both McLaughlin and Travelers moved for summary
judgment on the breach of contract claim. The trial court
concluded that the ordinary and common meaning of the term
"pedestrian" does not include a bicyclist. It
therefore granted Traveler's motion for summary judgment
and denied McLaughlin's motion for summary judgment.
argues that because the ordinary meaning of
"pedestrian" includes a bicyclist, the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to Travelers. We disagree.
court reviews summary judgment determinations de novo,
engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court."'
Kut Suen Lui v. Essex Ins. Co., 185 Wn.2d 703,
709-10, 375 P.3d 596 (2016) (quoting Durland v. San Juan
County, 182Wn.2d 55, 69, 340 P.3d 191 (2014)).
'"Summary judgment is proper where there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Kut
Suen Lui, 185 Wn.2d at 710 (quoting Durland,
182 Wn.2d at 69)). "Courts interpret language in an
insurance policy as a matter of law," and this court
reviews those interpretations de novo. Kut Suen Lui,
185 Wn.2d at 710. As the insured, McLaughlin bears the burden
to prove that he was entitled to coverage under the policy.
E-Z Loader Boat Trailers. Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 106 Wn.2d 901, 906, 726 P.2d 439 (1986).
construe insurance policies as contracts. Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654, 665, 15
P.3d 115 (2000). When the court interprets an insurance
policy, it considers the insurance policy as a whole, giving
the policy "'a fair, reasonable, and sensible
construction as would be given to the contract by the average
person purchasing insurance.'" Quadrant Corp. v.
Am. States Ins. Co.. 154 Wn.2d 165, 171, 110 P.3d 733
(2005) (quoting Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wn.2d at 666).
"Undefined terms in an insurance contract must be given
their 'plain, ordinary, and popular' meaning."
Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wn.2d
869, 877, 784 P.2d 507 (1990) (quoting Farmers Ins. Co.
of Wash, v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 73, 549 P.2d 9 (1976)).
"To determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term,
our courts look to standard English language
dictionaries." Boeing, 113 Wn.2d at 877.
McLaughlin's policy covers "reasonable expenses
incurred for necessary medical and funeral services because
of 'bodily injury': 1. Caused by an accident; and 2.
Sustained by an 'insured.'" The policy defines
an "insured" as:
1. You or any "resident relative":
a. While "occupying"; or