United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON JUDGE
MATTER is before the Court on the following motions:
Defendant Newby's Motion for Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law to Support Dismissal (sic) of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 32]; Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal and Stay of Proceedings [Dkt. # 36]; and
Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Recusal [Dkt. #
41]. Also pending is Newby's Motion for a Protective
Order, noted for August 9. That Motion will be resolved in a
cites no authority for his request that the Court make
findings of fact and enter conclusions of law to support its
denial of Newby's facially-frivolous motion to dismiss.
Such findings are entered at the end of a bench trial. They
are inappropriate on a motion to dismiss, or even on a motion
for summary judgment. Newby's Motion for the Court to
enter findings and conclusions in support of its denial of
his motion is DENIED.
also seeks to appeal (or claims that he has already appealed)
the Order denying his motion to dismiss. Interlocutory
appeals are not the norm, and they are not appeals as of
right. Normally, a party may appeal only a final judgment. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292. An Order denying a motion to
dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction is not a final
judgment. Newby must therefore obtain this Court's
permission (or the Ninth Circuit's) to file an
interlocutory appeal. The standard for such a request
requires Newby to demonstrate that the order involves a
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and that immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation. § 1292(b). Newby has not met this standard;
there is no room for difference of reasonable opinion as to
whether this Court has jurisdiction over Newby, a resident of
Washington state. Newby's Motion for Leave to file an
Interlocutory Appeal on this point is
DENIED. Newby's request for a stay is
Newby asks the Court to Reconsider its Order denying his
motion to recuse. He repeats his claim that the Court's
failure to recognize the wisdom and accuracy of his
authorities on the Court's jurisdiction is evidence of
its bias against him.
Local Rule 7(h)(1), motions for reconsideration are
disfavored, and will ordinarily be denied unless there is a
showing of (a) manifest error in the ruling, or (b) facts or
legal authority which could not have been brought to the
attention of the court earlier, through reasonable diligence.
The term “manifest error” is “an error that
is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete
disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in
the record.” Black's Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed.
is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in
the interests of finality and conservation of judicial
resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A]
motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent
highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is
presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear
error, or if there is an intervening change in the
controlling law.” Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc. v.
Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir.
2009). Neither the Local Civil Rules nor the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, which allow for a motion for
reconsideration, is intended to provide litigants with a
second bite at the apple. A motion for reconsideration should
not be used to ask a court to rethink what the court had
already thought through - rightly or wrongly. Defenders
of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz.
1995). Mere disagreement with a previous order is an
insufficient basis for reconsideration, and reconsideration
may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could
have been presented at the time of the challenged decision.
Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363
F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005). “Whether or not to
grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of
the court.” Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041,
1046 (9th Cir. 2003).
judge's prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for
recusal. United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939
(9th Cir. 1986); see also Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (“To
warrant recusal, judicial bias must stem from an
sole, repeated argument is that the Court's Order is
wrong. That is almost never a valid basis for recusal, and it
certainly is not ...