United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court sua sponte on the
Court's Order to Show Cause. Dkt. #7. Therein the Court
required that Plaintiff demonstrate that she had properly
exhausted her administrative remedies in this employment
discrimination action and that that her action was timely.
Finding Plaintiff's response inadequate for the following
reasons, the Court dismisses the action.
forth in the Court's Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint makes the following allegations related to
her claims of employment discrimination:
Plaintiff indicates that she is a Filipina-American female
over the age of 40. In December 2012, she began working under
a new supervisor who treated her disparately and used racial
epithets to refer to Plaintiff. When she reported the
discriminatory treatment, her employer did nothing and she
was forced to continue working in a hostile work environment
and encounter further discrimination. Dkt. #7 at 4-5. At some
point Plaintiff was injured from a fall and, in conjunction
with panic attacks and depression from the discrimination,
her doctor advised her to work light duty at times.
Id. at 5. Defendants refused to accommodate
Plaintiff and instead terminated her in May 2015.
Id. at 3. Plaintiff brings claims for (1) racial
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17)
(“Title VII”); (2) retaliation under Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112 to 12117) (“ADA”); and (3)
hostile work environment under Title VII, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
§§ 621 to 634) (“ADEA”). Id. at
Dkt. #7 at 1-2.
Court's Order to Show Cause additionally laid out at
least some of the procedural requirements relevant to
Plaintiff's action which did not appear to be satisfied
in this case:
Plaintiff does not allege that she exhausted her
administrative remedies prior to initiating this action.
Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002)
(EEOC charge required prior to initiating Title VII action);
Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176
(9th Cir. 2000) (EEOC charge required prior to initiating ADA
action); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 173 (3rd
Cir. 2007) (Rehabilitation Act adopts Title VII procedures);
Forester v. Chertoff, 500 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir.
2007) (ADEA action requires prior filing with EEOC). Further,
Plaintiff was required to file her claims with the EEOC
within a specific period following the time the unlawful
employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
(180 or 300-day period for Title VII, ADA, and Rehabilitation
Act claims); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (180-day period for ADEA
claims). Further still, Plaintiff was required to file her
action within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. §
12117; 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). On the Amended Complaint
alone, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has satisfied
the statutory prerequisites to initiating this action.
Dkt. #7 at 3. The Court accordingly ordered Plaintiff to
demonstrate compliance with these procedural requirements.
has responded but has failed to present any evidence that she
has complied with the applicable requirements. Dkt. #8.
Rather, Plaintiff argues that the 7th Amendment to the United
States Constitution preserves her right to a jury trial and
that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 discriminates against economically
disadvantaged persons. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff further
argues that this statutory scheme works to the advantage of
“big business” and employers and urges that the
Court should pursue “justice as opposed to merely
abiding by ‘procedural safeguards.'”
Id. at 2.
points to only two cases, neither of which support her cause.
Plaintiff quotes Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974), a case that has been partially
overruled and deals with the extent to which prison
regulations may limit prisoners' access to the
courts. Plaintiff also quotes International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). While this case is an employment discrimination
action, it in no way deals with the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing suit. Plaintiff does
not point to any authority to demonstrate that her action is
timely and does not make any argument that it is.
Plaintiff's reliance on policy arguments does not provide
a valid basis for this Court to depart from clear legal
detailed in the Court's Order to Show Cause,
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Dkt. #7. Because
Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the Court is required to dismiss the
case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (court shall dismiss
lawsuit that does not adequately state a claim).
a court dismissing a complaint should freely grant leave to
amend “unless it is absolutely clear that the
deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
amendment.” Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446,
1448 (9th Cir. 1987); see also DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A
district court does not err in denying leave to amend where
the amendment would be futile.”) (citing Reddy v.
Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990)).
The Court finds that leave to amend is not warranted here.
The Court identified specific procedural deficiencies that
Plaintiff needed to address, and Plaintiff made no attempt to
demonstrate that she had complied with those procedural
requirements. The Court therefore concludes that amendment
would be futile.
considered Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and the
remainder of the record in this matter, the Court finds and
ORDERS that all of Plaintiff's claims asserted in her
Amended Complaint (Dkt. #6) are DISMISSED with prejudice.
This matter is now CLOSED. The ...