United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
A. TSUCHIDA CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
matter was initiated in 2001 when plaintiff filed a §
1983 complaint against his public defender, David Ryann. Dkt.
3. On February 11, 2002, the assigned District Judge
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Dkt. 7. On February
26, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, Dkt. 9, which the Court denied. Dkt.
10. On July 19 and July 22, 2019, plaintiff filed a proposed
supplemental complaint and a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under this case number. Dkts. 13, 14. The proposed
complaint alleges the 2002 order and judgment dismissing
plaintiff's case is “void” because there were
“issued without all facts or records present,
Allah© NFN prays for immediate release with
compensation.” Dkt. 12 at 1. The proposed habeas
petition alleges the King County Superior Court lacked
jurisdiction to convict and sentence plaintiff in King County
Case numbers 99-1-06987-7-SEA, 01-1-0807-3-SEA,
01-1-09176-6-SEA and 02-1-02047-6-SEA because among other
things, those convictions are in the name of “Coston,
Edwin, Randal” and violate the “Emancipation
Proclamation.” Dkt. 13 at 1, 7.
proposed complaint and petition for writ of habeas corpus
were referred to the undersigned on August 19, 2019. Dkt. 17.
The Court recommends the proposed complaint and habeas
petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.
is a state prisoner who is currently confined at the
Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla, Washington. The
Court should dismiss plaintiff's proposed complaint and
habeas petition because they suffer from numerous
deficiencies which no amendment can cure.
the proposed complaint is brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, and
challenges the judgment the Court entered in 2002 in this
case. This Court has already entertained and rejected the
Rule 60 motion to vacate the judgment plaintiff filed in
2002. Plaintiff is not entitled to repetitively file the same
motion, nor may he file such a motion in violation of Rule
60's requirement that the motion be filed “no later
than a year after entry of the judgment or order.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 (c)(1).
plaintiff seeks immediate release, an action not cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When a person confined by
government is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks will determine
that he is or was entitled to immediate release or a speedier
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a
writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 500 (1973). In order to recover damages for an
alleged unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994). Plaintiff makes no such allegations here.
both the proposed complaint and habeas petition are
duplicative of other actions plaintiff has previously brought
and which have been previously dismissed. See Adams v.
California Department of Health Services, 487 F.3d 684,
688 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs generally have no
right to maintain two separate actions involving the same
subject matter at the same time in the same court against the
is a frequent litigant in this Court. Since 2001, the
Court's records indicate that he has filed 24 actions as
a petitioner (habeas) and 18 actions as a plaintiff (civil
rights). Among the cases previously filed by plaintiff are at
least two federal habeas actions in which plaintiff
challenged the judgments entered in King County Superior
Court in Case No. 01-1-10807-3 and 02-1-02047-6. See
Allahv. Brunson, C05-1480-MJP (addressing 01-1-10807-3
and 01-1-09176-6) and Allah v. Frakes, C12-484-TSZ
(addressing 01-1-10807-3, 01-1-09176-6, and 02-1-02047-6).
The first petition was denied and the case dismissed with
prejudice in March 2009. See C05-1480-MJP, Dkt. 62.
has repeatedly attempted to challenge various state court
judgments, including the 2002 King County Superior Court
judgment at issue in this action. See Allah v. Washington
State Supreme Court, C17-458-RSM; Allah v.
Holbrook, C16-535-RSL; Allah v. Robinson,
C14-1234-TSZ. Petitioner's challenges to his 2002
judgment have previously been rejected because of his failure
to clearly identify the federal constitutional grounds upon
which he was seeking relief from the judgment, and his
failure to show that the claims pertaining to his 2002
judgment had been properly exhausted in the state courts.
habeas petition was deemed a successive petition and was
dismissed in September 2012. See C12-484-TSZ, Dkts.
22 and 23. Plaintiff's challenge to the judgment in Case
No. 02-1-02047-6 was dismissed because he had not clearly
identified the federal constitutional grounds upon which he
sought relief from that judgment and he had not demonstrated
that any constitutional claims pertaining to that judgment
had been properly exhausted in the state courts. See
id. When plaintiff sought to challenge the judgment in
Case No. 02-1-02047-6 a second time, the Court again found
that he had failed to provide evidence that his claims had
been properly exhausted. His petition was denied and the case
was dismissed. See C14-1234-TSZ, Dkts. 13 and 18.
Plaintiff submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus
asserting that he is being unlawfully restrained pursuant to
“bogus” judgments entered in two King County
Superior Court criminal cases (Nos. 01-1-10807-3 and
02-1-02047-6), and a Franklin County Superior Court criminal
case (No. 12-1-50324-8).
number 16-535-RSL, plaintiff submitted a pleading that he
identified as a petition for writ of mandamus, but which the
Court construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus
because petitioner indicated therein that he was challenging
his imprisonment based on a 2002 judgment of the King County
Superior Court (Case No. 02-1-02047-6). See Dkts. 1,
5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13. Plaintiff contended, as he does here, his
current confinement is unlawful because the courts, the
Washington Department of Corrections, and all relevant
records do not adequately refer to his name
“Allah©, ” refer to him by inapplicable
personal or possessive pronouns such as “he” and
“his, ” and erroneously refer to a name with
which he no longer identifies of “Edward R.
Coston.” See C16-535-RSL, Dkt. 11, at 1-8. He
sought immediate release from confinement and damages for
false restraint. Id. at 13-14.
has also filed prior complaints alleging a violation of his
civil rights based upon a variety of claims including the
King County Clerk breached a contract, state actors kidnapped
his children, and that the criminal acts against him were
taken in the name of Edwin Coston instead of Allah. See
e.g. Allah v. Paul Sherfey, et al., C17-1746-RSM.
the proposed habeas petition is barred by the statute of
limitations. Federal habeas corpus petitions filed by persons
imprisoned under a state court judgment are subject to a
one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A),
“[t]he limitation period shall run from . . . the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review . . . .” Additionally, “[t]he time during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any
period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). Here, plaintiff is