United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
Michelle L. Peterson United States Magistrate Judge.
1: Computer Hacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1030(a)(2)(A) and (C), and (c)(2)(A), and (B)(iii)
of Detention Hearing: August 23, 2019
Court, having conducted a detention hearing pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f), and based upon the reasons for
detention hereafter set forth, finds:
government moved for a detention hearing in this matter,
arguing Defendant poses both a risk of flight and a danger to
the community. (Dkt. # 13 at 8-11.) Defendant argued that as
a threshold matter, the government has not established
Defendant is a flight risk under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f),
and therefore objected to the court holding a detention
hearing, and further argued the government failed to meet its
burden in showing Defendant is a danger to the community.
(See Dkt. # 19.)
procedural requirements for a pre-trial detention hearing are
set forth in section 3142(f), as part of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 (the “Act”). Under the Act, courts
“shall hold” detention hearings in two instances.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The first instance is when the case
involves any one of the enumerated serious offenses outlined
in § 3142(f)(1). The second instance is when a case
involves a serious risk of flight or obstruction of justice.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). Once one of these conditions is
sufficiently met, a detention hearing is held “to
determine whether any condition or combination of conditions
... will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as
required and the safety of any other person and the
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
determine whether conditions of release could reasonably
assure a defendant's appearance in court and the safety
of the community, courts consider the nature and seriousness
of the charges, the weight of the evidence against the
defendant, the defendant's history and characteristics,
and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed to any
person or the community by the defendant's release. 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g). The weight of the evidence is the
least important factor in this analysis. United States v.
Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985).
government bears the burden of showing that a defendant poses
a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence,
and it bears the burden of showing that a defendant poses a
flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991).
“Danger, ” as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. §
3143, “may, at least in some cases, encompass pecuniary
or economic harm.” United States v. Reynolds,
956 F.2d 192, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Hickey, No. CR 97-0218 WHA, 2006 WL 1867708,
*3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2006) (finding that there was a risk
that defendant would perpetrate additional fraudulent schemes
because he stated that he would like to develop a new real
estate investment, and this might easily tempt him to resort
to the type of fraud and deceit that led to his conviction).
OF FACT AND STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DETENTION
government alleges Defendant hacked into servers used by
Capital One Financial Corporation and stole information from
credit card application of approximately 106 million people.
This data breach has resulted in at least 40 lawsuits against
Capital One Financial Corporation, who expects to incur
between $100 and 150 million this year as a result. Due to
the nature and circumstances of the alleged offense,
Defendant faces a substantial sentence if found guilty.
government alleges that when Defendant's residence was
searched, agents found terabytes of data stolen from an
additional 30 other companies, educational institutions, and
government alleges forensic evidence links Defendant to the
data theft, including stolen data from Capital One Financial
Corporation found on a ...