United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Bronson
Potter's (“Potter”) motion for
reconsideration, Dkt. 175, Defendant Jonathan Young's
(“Young”) motion for reconsideration, Dkt. 176,
and Defendant the City of Vancouver's
(“City”) motion for reconsideration, Dkt. 177.
August 21, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Potter, Young, the City, and Defendant Eric Holmes's
(“Holmes”) motions for summary judgment. Dkt.
170. On September 4, 2019, Potter, Young, and the City each
moved for reconsideration. Dkts. 175, 176, 177.
facts of the case are set forth in the Court's order on
the motions for summary judgment. Dkt. 170.
for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule 7(h), which
provides as follows:
Motions for reconsideration are disfavored. The court will
ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of
manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts
or legal authority which could not have been brought to its
attention earlier with reasonable diligence.
Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h). “[A] motion for
reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual
circumstances, unless the district court is presented with
newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there
is an intervening change in the controlling law.”
Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 389 Orange Street
Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)).
case, Potter, Young, and the City each move for
reconsideration on the basis that the Court committed
manifest errors of law.
asks the Court to reconsider its decision to deny his motion
for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Debra Quinn's
(“Quinn”) disparate treatment claim against him.
Dkt. 175 at 1.
alleged Potter subjected her to disparate treatment on the
basis of gender when Potter decided to promote Young instead
of Quinn to the Chief Assistant City Attorney position in
2014. Potter argues that the Court committed manifest error
by relying on inadmissible hearsay to establish an inference
that discrimination was a substantial factor motivating
Potter's decision. Dkt. 175 at 2. In their joint motion
for summary judgment, Potter and Young made evidentiary
objections on a substantial number of issues in the case.
Dkt. 134 at 2 n.1. The Court explained that on summary
judgment, a court may consider evidence that “could be
presented in an admissible form at trial. Dkt. 170 at 43
(quoting Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th
Cir. 2003)). The Court also explained that Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(2) permits a party to “object that the material
cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.”
Potter argues that the Court improperly relied on Quinn's
testimony that Chief Molina told her Potter made a negative
comment about her during an interview panel in the hiring
process for the position. Dkt. 175 at 3. Potter argues that
Quinn had “ample opportunity to obtain a sworn
declaration from Chief Molina or to take his deposition to
present such evidence to the court, ” or produce a text
message Quinn said she received from Chief Molina.
Id. The Court is not persuaded nor does Potter
provide authority establishing that it is clear error to
consider evidence that could be admissible because an
opposing party failed to obtain and submit the evidence in an
admissible form for purposes of summary judgment. At the very
least, the statement may ...