United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING SUBJECT MATTER
L. ROBART, United States District Judge.
the court is Plaintiff Sing Cho Ng’s complaint. (Compl.
(Dkt. # 4).) Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida granted Mr.
Ng leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on
August 30, 2019. (8/30/19 Order (Dkt. # 3).) However,
Magistrate Judge Tsuchida also recommended that the court
review complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) prior
to issuing any summons. (See Id . at 1.)
brings his complaint against a King County Superior Court
Judge Janet Helson, a deputy clerk and a bailiff of King
County Superior Court, an attorney who represented parties
who were adverse to Mr. Ng in proceedings in King County
Superior Court, and other “yet-be-identified [sic] King
County Superior Court officials. (See Compl. at
1-2.) Although his complaint is disjointed and difficult to
follow, he appears to be complaining about the results of two
state court unlawful detainer actions filed to remove him
from certain property. (See generally id.)
the fourth action that Mr. Ng has filed in this court since
2017 against a related and overlapping group of defendants.
See Ng. v. King King Ass’n, et al., No.
C17-1515RAJ (“Ng I”); Ng. v. Metz,
et al., No. C18-0690JCC (“Ng II”);
Ng v. Metz, et al., No. C18-1212RSM (“Ng
I addressed Mr. Ng’s claims related to his
landlord’s rent increase and subsequent actions taken
to evict Mr. Ng. (See generally, Ng I, Dkt.
#4.) Mr. Ng maintained that his landlord acted in concert
with other defendants to remove Mr. Ng from his apartment and
allow a construction project to proceed. (Id.) On
July 30, 2018, the court dismissed Ng I for failure
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
with leave to amend. (See generally, id., Dkt. #
30.) Mr. Ng filed an amended complaint on August 22, 2018.
(See id., Dkt. # 34.) On March 28, 2019, the court
dismissed Mr. Ng’s amended complaint with prejudice
because the allegations in his amended complaint
“effectively mirror[ed] those pled in [his] initial
complaint.” (Id., Dkt. # 52 at 3.)
II addressed Mr. Ng’s claims related to Judge
Helson’s adjudication of two state court unlawful
detainer actions, which were filed to remove Mr. Ng from the
property. (See generally, Ng II, Dkt. #5.)
The first state court unlawful detainer action was quickly
dismissed. (See id.) The second was pursued to
judgment-albeit with various alleged irregularities of which
Mr. Ng complains-and appealed to the state court of appeals.
(See id.) On July 9, 2018, prior to issuing summons,
the court dismissed Ng II based on 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). (Id., Dkt. # 10.) On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of Mr. Ng’s complaint.
(Id., Dkt # 20.)
III rehashed the claims advanced in Ng II and
followed the court’s dismissal of Ng II.
(See generally Ng III, Dkt. # 9 (Compl.); see
also id., Dkt. # 13 (OSC) at 2.) On November 20, 2018,
the court dismissed Ng III prior to issuing summons.
(Id., Dkt. # 13.) On July 16, 2019, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed Mr. Ng’s appeal as frivolous.
(Id., Dkt. # 22.)
filed his current action on August 29, 2019-a little over one
month following the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of Mr.
Ng’s appeal of Ng III as frivolous.
(See IFP Mot. (Dkt. # 1).) Mr. Ng once again
rehashes the claims he advanced in Ng II and Ng
III. (See generally Compl.) Although lengthy
and even more disjointed than his prior complaints, Mr. Ng
again complains of many alleged procedural and substantive
irregularities and perceived errors that occurred in various
state court actions. (See generally id.)
plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, as Mr. Ng does here,
the court is to dismiss the action, at any time, if it fails
to state a claim, raises frivolous or malicious claims, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, a
plaintiff also bears the burden of establishing that a case
is properly filed in federal court. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re Ford
Motor Co./Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d 952,
957 (9th Cir. 2001). Mr. Ng must meet this burden by pleading
sufficient allegations to show a proper basis for the federal
court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178, 189 (1936).
as in Ng III, Mr. Ng does not establish the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction because the action
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That
doctrine prevents federal district courts from otherwise
exercising jurisdiction in a narrow set of “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (quoting Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 54 U.S. 280,
284 (2005)) (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine is
premised on the United ...