United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
CLARK LANDIS, ROBERT BARKER, GRADY THOMPSON, and KAYLA BROWN, Plaintiffs,
WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT, BASEBALL OF SEATTLE, INC., a Washington Corporation, MARINERS BASEBALL, LLC, a Washington limited liability Company, and THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LLLP, a Washington limited liability limited partnership, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the collective owners and operators of T-Mobile Field, have
submitted six motions in limine seeking to limit or exclude
evidence. Dkt. No. 36. Plaintiffs oppose the motions. Dkt.
No. 40. Having reviewed the motions, the opposition thereto,
the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities,
the Court will grant some of the motions, and deny
others. The reasoning for the Court's decision
Court recently laid out the background of this case in depth
in its order granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 32.
Motion in Limine No. 1
seek to exclude any opinions Plaintiffs' expert, James
Terry, may proffer at trial addressing potential remedial
measures for alleged barriers to access at T-Mobile Field.
Dkt. No. 36 at 6-8. According to Defendants, Mr. Terry's
expert report, Dkt. No. 20-1, is limited to identifying
alleged architectural barriers, but does not offer any
opinion regarding potential remediation measures.
Id. at 4.
in response, concede that Mr. Terry's report does not
address specific remedial measures, but insist that he should
be allowed to testify to "general solutions to similar
problems, at other parks." Dkt. No. 40 at 2. They also
claim that he should be allowed to rebut any claims, if made,
that any particular remedial measure is not feasible.
Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 37(c)(1) provides
that, where a party fails to provide information
"required by Rule 26(a) or (e), " the party is
"not allowed to use that information ... at a trial,
unless the failure was substantially justified or is
harmless." FED. R. Civ. Pro. 37(c)(1); see also Yeti
by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101,
1106 (9th Cir. 2001). FRCP 26(a)(2)(B), in turn, provides
that expert witnesses must provide a report, including
"a complete statement of all opinions the witness will
express and the basis and reasons for them." Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(B)(i).
Mr. Terry's report did not include any opinions on
potential remedial measures for T-Mobile Field. Additionally,
Plaintiffs have provided no substantial justification for Mr.
Terry's failure to include such opinions in his report.
As such, Mr. Terry is barred from offering such testimony at
Terry, however, may identify "general solutions"
that have been utilized in other stadiums based on his
expertise. As Plaintiffs' point out, Defendants were
given an opportunity to question Mr. Terry on the subject of
general solutions during his deposition. See Dkt.
No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 40-1. Mr. Terry may not, however,
testify as to how those general solutions may suit T-Mobile
Field, as he himself has admitted that he does not have a
basis for such opinions. Dkt. No. 41-1 ("I have opinions
about specific remedies, I have not compared those specific
opinions and those specific solution types to this facility
on a dimensional basis to know which ones of them will work
in which locations, and which ones won't, because some of
them you just have- to compare them to the specific
Defendants' motion to exclude evidence and argument
concerning measures to remediate alleged barriers at T-Mobile
Field is GRANTED.