United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
DOUGLAS H. ROUGH, Plaintiff,
CHASE BANK, et al., Defendant.
HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on motions to dismiss by
Defendants Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and
Barclayscard. Dkt. ## 48, 52. For the reasons stated below,
the Court GRANTS both motions. Additionally,
the Court GRANTS Chase's pending motion
to strike and DENIES as moot Chase's
motion to quash. Dkt. ## 55, 60.
the Court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss,
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) on June 3, 2019. See Dkt. ## 40,
45, 46, 47. Plaintiff alleges that he was offered employment
by Defendant MC Medical AG in September 2017. Dkt. # 47 at 1.
He claims that the company told him a permanent job offer
would follow on November 1, 2017 if he passed a series of
training tests. Id. The alleged agreement between
Plaintiff and MC Medical AG would pay him $2, 500 for
training and did not prevent him from working elsewhere
during the training period. Id. at 1-2.
October 11, 2017, Plaintiff claims that MC Medical AG asked
him to purchase equipment and agreed to transfer money to his
Chase credit card to cover the transactions. Id. at
2. Plaintiff states that he was unfamiliar with this type of
transfer and called Chase. Id. He claims to have
asked Chase whether the transfer to his account could be
reversed. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges that Chase
told him the transfer could not be reversed after 24 hours
without a court order. Id. at 4. During the call,
Plaintiff alleges the Chase representative made no mention of
the possibility of suspicious activity with this type of
transfer or that Plaintiff had to be the “owner”
of the transferring account. Id. Plaintiff alleges
that he received a Chase account number from MC Medical AG
and executed the money transfer to his Chase credit card.
Id. After waiting 24 hours, Plaintiff alleges that
he made multiple purchases for MC Medical AG on his credit
October 16, 2017, Plaintiff claims that he was approached by
another company, Defendant ALN. Id. at 9. He alleges
that ALN asked him to execute a transaction for equipment
like the one he completed with MC Medical AG. Id. at
10. Based on his experience with the Chase transfer,
Plaintiff alleges he essentially conducted the same
transaction with ALN-this time he received a Wells Fargo
account number, transferred money to his Barclaycard, and
purchased equipment for ALN. Id. at 10-12.
claims that after three weeks, the money transfers to both
his Chase credit card and his Barclaycard were reversed.
Id. at 11-16. Plaintiff states that he is a victim
of fraud. Id. at 22. He brings this action
claiming, in part, that Defendants Chase and Barclayscard are
complicit in financial fraud schemes by not taking
affirmative actions to stop it. Id. at 11.
Specifically, he claims the fraud here would not have been
possible without advice from Chase and could have been
stopped with simple authentication measures. Id. at
22. He seeks in damages the cost of the fraud, the cost to
investigate, the interest charged by the banks, and future
lost wages. Id.
and Barclayscard filed motions to dismiss the SAC, which is
now before the Court. Dkt. ## 48, 52.
12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for failure
to state a claim. The rule requires the court to assume the
truth of the complaint's factual allegations and credit
all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations.
Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007).
A court “need not accept as true conclusory allegations
that are contradicted by documents referred to in the
complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The
plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568
(2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids
dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with
the allegations in the complaint” that would entitle
the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of
the complaint, although it may rely on a document to which
the complaint refers if the document is central to the
party's claims and its authenticity is not in question.
Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006).
A court may also consider evidence subject to judicial
notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908
(9th Cir. 2003).
overcome a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff need only allege facts that “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568. Although not completely
clear from the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to be suing the
defendant banks for violations of RICO, the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA), Regulation Z, and the Bank Secrecy Act.
See Dkt. # 47. Even considering these
clarifications, the Court finds that ...