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Rough v. Chase Bank

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

September 27, 2019

DOUGLAS H. ROUGH, Plaintiff,
v.
CHASE BANK, et al., Defendant.

          ORDER

          THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This matter comes before the Court on motions to dismiss by Defendants Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and Barclayscard. Dkt. ## 48, 52. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS both motions. Additionally, the Court GRANTS Chase's pending motion to strike and DENIES as moot Chase's motion to quash. Dkt. ## 55, 60.

         II. BACKGROUND

         After the Court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on June 3, 2019. See Dkt. ## 40, 45, 46, 47. Plaintiff alleges that he was offered employment by Defendant MC Medical AG in September 2017. Dkt. # 47 at 1. He claims that the company told him a permanent job offer would follow on November 1, 2017 if he passed a series of training tests. Id. The alleged agreement between Plaintiff and MC Medical AG would pay him $2, 500 for training and did not prevent him from working elsewhere during the training period. Id. at 1-2.

         On October 11, 2017, Plaintiff claims that MC Medical AG asked him to purchase equipment and agreed to transfer money to his Chase credit card to cover the transactions. Id. at 2. Plaintiff states that he was unfamiliar with this type of transfer and called Chase. Id. He claims to have asked Chase whether the transfer to his account could be reversed. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges that Chase told him the transfer could not be reversed after 24 hours without a court order. Id. at 4. During the call, Plaintiff alleges the Chase representative made no mention of the possibility of suspicious activity with this type of transfer or that Plaintiff had to be the “owner” of the transferring account. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he received a Chase account number from MC Medical AG and executed the money transfer to his Chase credit card. Id. After waiting 24 hours, Plaintiff alleges that he made multiple purchases for MC Medical AG on his credit card. Id.

         On October 16, 2017, Plaintiff claims that he was approached by another company, Defendant ALN. Id. at 9. He alleges that ALN asked him to execute a transaction for equipment like the one he completed with MC Medical AG. Id. at 10. Based on his experience with the Chase transfer, Plaintiff alleges he essentially conducted the same transaction with ALN-this time he received a Wells Fargo account number, transferred money to his Barclaycard, and purchased equipment for ALN. Id. at 10-12.

         Plaintiff claims that after three weeks, the money transfers to both his Chase credit card and his Barclaycard were reversed. Id. at 11-16. Plaintiff states that he is a victim of fraud. Id. at 22. He brings this action claiming, in part, that Defendants Chase and Barclayscard are complicit in financial fraud schemes by not taking affirmative actions to stop it. Id. at 11. Specifically, he claims the fraud here would not have been possible without advice from Chase and could have been stopped with simple authentication measures. Id. at 22. He seeks in damages the cost of the fraud, the cost to investigate, the interest charged by the banks, and future lost wages. Id.

         Chase and Barclayscard filed motions to dismiss the SAC, which is now before the Court.[1] Dkt. ## 48, 52.

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. The rule requires the court to assume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

         A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the document is central to the party's claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

         IV. DISCUSSION

         To overcome a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only allege facts that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568. Although not completely clear from the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to be suing the defendant banks for violations of RICO, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Regulation Z, and the Bank Secrecy Act. See Dkt. # 47. Even considering these clarifications, the Court finds that ...


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