United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
C. COUGHENOUR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on the Defendant Marie
Christine Fanyo-Patchou, Defendant Rordigue Fodjo Kamdem, and
the Government's unopposed motion to continue the trial
date and pretrial motions deadline (Dkt. No. 79). Ms.
Fanyo-Patchou and Mr. Kamdem have filed speedy trial waivers
up to and including February 17, 2020, and March 3, 2020,
respectively. (Dkt. Nos. 91-92.) Defendant Christian Fredy
Djoko, however, has not. (See Dkt. No. 79 at 2.)
While Mr. Djoko's attorneys have explained to him that
they require additional time to provide him with effective
assistance of counsel, Mr. Djoko does not wish to sign a
speedy trial waiver. (See id.) The Court must
therefore decide whether to move the trial date despite Mr.
Djoko's decision to not sign a waiver.
Speedy Trial Act requires that “[i]n any case in which
a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant . .
. shall commence within seventy days from the filing date
(and making public) of the information or indictment, or from
the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer
of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date
last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). However,
certain “periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which . . . the trial . . . must
commence.” Id. § 3161(h). The Act lists
several types of excludable delay, see Id. §
3161(h)(1)-(6), and also allows exclusion if “the court
sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in
writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice
served by [a continuance] outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial, ” see
Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In making such a finding, the
court must consider certain non-exhaustive factors. See
Id. § 3167(h)(7)(B).
the moving parties argue that a continuance is necessary
because of the complex nature of the case and the need for
additional discovery. (See Dkt. No. 79 at 2-5.) To
date, the Government has provided 5, 485 pages and digital
files to the defense. (Id. at 3.) Many of those
pages are in a combination of French and Ewondo, and the
Government's translation firm still needs to translate
the pages. (Id.) Once the translations are complete,
the parties will need time to review them. (Id.) In
addition, the parties may need to continue to investigate who
received or sent text and online messages and communications
with Defendants, John Doe, and John Doe's family members.
(Id. at 4.) Those investigations could potentially
take place in Cameroon and other foreign countries.
considered the parties' arguments for a continuance and
the relevant record, the Court agrees that a continuance is
necessary. The Court FINDS as follows:
1. Failure to grant a continuance would likely result in a
miscarriage of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(7)(B)(i). The parties have had only limited time to
review a large volume of materials produced during discovery.
(See Dkt. No. 79 at 3-5). In addition, important
discovery may still need to take place. (See Id. at
2. The case is so unusual and complex that it is unreasonable
to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings and
the trial itself within the time limits established by the
Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(7)(B)(ii). The Government has charged three
defendants with conspiracy to engage in cyberstalking and
with cyberstalking. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-6.) The
alleged conspiracy involves communications with many
different people in multiple countries. (See id.)
These allegations have raised complex factual and legal
issues, including constitutional issues. (See Dkt.
No. 58 at 15-16.)
3. The additional time requested is a reasonable period of
delay, as Ms. Fanyo-Patchou and Mr. Kamdem have requested
more time to prepare for trial, investigate the matter,
gather evidence material to the defense, and to consider
possible defenses. (See Dkt. No. 79 at 3-5.)
4. The additional time requested between the current trial
date and the new trial date is necessary to provide
Defendants' attorneys reasonable time to prepare for
trial considering their schedules and all of the facts set
5. The ends of justice will best be served by a continuance,
and the ends of justice outweigh the best interests of the
public and Defendants in any speedier trial. See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
foregoing reasons, the unopposed motion to continue the trial
date and pretrial motions deadline (Dkt. No. 79) is GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that the trial date is CONTINUED from
October 7, 2019, to February 3, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. The time
between the date of this order and the new trial date is
excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to ...