appeals the denial of his motion to restore his firearm
rights after he completed a juvenile deferred disposition for
second degree malicious mischief, and the juvenile court
vacated his conviction. He contends that the juvenile court
erroneously concluded that the firearms statute, RCW
9.41.040, prohibits those with dismissed juvenile deferred
dispositions from owning a firearm. Alternatively, S.G.
argues his firearm rights were "automatically"
restored when his underlying conviction was vacated. We
disagree with S.G.'s arguments and affirm.
S.G. admitted to second degree malicious mischief, a class C
felony, after intentionally damaging a vehicle owned by
Thomas Rechak' and Aarin Morris. Two of S.G.'s
friends had been targeting Rechak and Morris and had enlisted
their friends, including S.G., to help them destroy Rechak
and Morris's personal property. Many of these incidents
were caught on video by a neighbor's home surveillance
system. On May 31, 2017, the surveillance system caught S.G.
vandalizing Rechak's 1994 Ford van. The video showed S.G.
scratching the paint on the driver side and hood of the
vehicle, causing over $2, 000 in damage. The juvenile court
found that S.G. was solely responsible for the damage.
November 28, 2017, S.G. pleaded guilty in exchange for a
deferred disposition under RCW 13.40.127. The juvenile
court ordered a six month deferred disposition. Under the
stipulated terms of the deferred disposition, S.G. lost his
right to possess a firearm. S.G. was also told that his right
to possess a firearm during the deferral period was
"gone until you come back to court and ask for it
back," to which S.G. agreed. Although S.G. turned 18 on
December 22, 2017, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction
over the case.
January 11, 2018, the juvenile court ordered restitution
"as a condition of disposition." It ordered S.G. to
pay Rechak or Morris $2, 427.38, the estimated cost of
repairing the Ford van. The restitution order required S.G.
to make monthly payments of $10 until he had fully repaid the
restitution obligation. On May 4, 2018, the juvenile court
dismissed S.G.'s juvenile deferred disposition and
vacated his conviction, but the order noted that the case
could not be sealed until S.G. had completed the restitution
later, on May 11, 2018, S.G. moved to restore his firearm
rights. S.G. argued that the definition of
"conviction" in the firearms statute, RCW 9.41.040,
did not extend to juvenile deferred dispositions. The trial
court denied the motion, reasoning that a
"conviction" under RCW 9.41.040, criminalizing the
unlawful possession of a firearm, occurs when a person enters
a plea of guilty and includes juvenile deferred dispositions.
See RCW 9.41.040(3). S.G. appeals.
the firearms statute, RCW 9.41.040, a person, whether adult
or juvenile, may not possess a firearm "after having
previously been convicted ... of any serious offense
...." Subsection 3 of that same statute provides:
Notwithstanding . . . any other provision of law, ... a
person has been "convicted", whether in an adult
court or adjudicated in a juvenile court, at such time as a
plea of guilty has been accepted .:. notwithstanding the
pendency of any future proceedings including but not limited
to sentencing or disposition, post-trial or post-fact-finding
motions, and appeals. Conviction includes a dismissal
entered after a period of probation, suspension or deferral
of sentence, and also includes equivalent dispositions by
courts in jurisdictions other than Washington state.
RCW 9.41.040(3) (emphasis added).
first argues that because juvenile deferred dispositions are
not explicitly included in the definition of
"conviction" in RCW 9.41.040(3), they are exempt
from the statute. S.G. alternatively argues that his
conviction ceased to be a "conviction" under RCW
9.41.040(3) when the court vacated it, and his right to
possess a firearm was automatically restored. We consider
each argument in turn.
review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State
v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 172, 421 P.3d 944 (2018). The
purpose of statutory interpretation is "to determine and
give effect to the intent of the legislature."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724
(2013)). This court derives the legislative intent of a
statute "solely from the plain language by considering
the text of the provision in question, the context of the
statute in which the provision is found, related provisions,
and the statutory scheme as a whole." Id. at
172-73. Furthermore, when interpreting a criminal statute,
this court gives it "a literal and strict
interpretation." Id. at 172 (quoting State
v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003)).
"If, after this inquiry, there is more than one
reasonable interpretation of the plain language, then a
statute is ambiguous and we may rely on principles of
statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant
case law to discern legislative intent." Id. at
contends that RCW 9.41.040(3) expressly includes deferred
sentences in its definition of "conviction," but
makes no mention of dismissed juvenile deferred dispositions.
He argues that because a deferred sentence is not the same as