United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge
District Court referred this action, filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to United States Magistrate Judge David
W. Christel. Presently pending before the Court is Defendant
John Thompson's Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”). Dkt. 11.
reviewing the relevant record, the Court finds Plaintiff
Derick Owusu failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
regarding the claims raised in the Complaint. Therefore, the
Court recommends Defendant's Motion (Dkt. 11) be granted
and this case be closed.
an inmate currently housed at the Stafford Creek Corrections
Center (“SCCC”), alleges Defendant suspended
Plaintiff from the law library without reason in violation of
Plaintiff's access to the courts and due process rights.
filed the Motion on June 28, 2019. Dkt. 11. Plaintiff filed a
Response to the Motion on September 24, 2019 (Dkt. 17) and,
on September 27, 2019, Defendant filed a Reply. Dkt. 18.
Standard of Review
judgment is proper only if the pleadings, discovery, and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, show that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the
case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative
evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a
genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute,
requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions
of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
alleges Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him as to the claims alleged in the
Complaint. Dkt. 11. Plaintiff contends Defendant made the
grievance process unavailable to Plaintiff, excusing the
exhaustion requirement in this case. Dkt. 17.
a prisoner may bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, he must first exhaust all available
administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in cases covered by
§ 1997e(a) is mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 739 (2001). The mere fact a plaintiff has filed an
initial grievance under a prison's grievance policy does
not satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement; a plaintiff must
exhaust all levels of an available grievance
procedure before he can initiate litigation. See Id.
at 736-41; Porterv. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
524-25 (2002). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not
available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages,
exhaustion is still a prerequisite ...