United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
STEVEN K. YOUNG, Plaintiff,
DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
L. RDBART, United States District Judge.
September 3, 2019, the court ordered pro se
Plaintiff Steven K. Young to show cause for the second time
why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. (See 2d OSC (Dkt. # 23) at 1
(citing 1st OSC (Dkt. # 10).) Specifically, the court ordered
Mr. Young to file a written response that:
(a) asserts the citizenship of each member of Ditech
[Financial LLC ("Ditech")], and if any member of
Ditech is itself a limited liability company, each of that
company's members, until each layer of limited liability
company membership is reduced to the individual members; and
(b) asserts specific facts from which the court can determine
whether Mr. Young's claim falls under 15 U.S.C. Section
(Id. at 4.) The court cautioned Mr. Young that if he
"fails to show cause once again, the court will dismiss
his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
(Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Rosales v.
United States, 824 F.2d 799, 803 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987)).)
Young filed his response on September 16, 2019. (2d OSC Resp.
(Dkt. # 24).) In it, Mr. Young asserted the citizenship of
"the following Board Members of Ditech who are citizens
of the State of Pennsylvania." (See Id. at 2.)
Mr. Young appears to confuse "director" with
"member." LLC members are those with an ownership
interest in the LLC, and are not necessarily directors.
See, e.g., RCW 25.15.116. Mr. Young does not assert
that the directors he lists are all Ditech members, and if
so, whether the list of directors is the complete list of
Ditech members. Therefore, Mr. Young has again failed to
assert "the citizenship of each member of Ditech."
(See 2d OSC at 4); see also Johnson v. Columbia
Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.
2006) ("We therefore join our sister circuits and hold
that, like a partnership, an LLC is a citizen of every state
of which its owners/members are citizens.") (emphasis
Young also fails to assert "specific facts from which
the court can determine whether Mr. Young's claim falls
under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e." (See generally id.;
see also 2d OSC Resp. at 4.) Instead, Mr. Young requests
that the court transfer "this proceeding/case to the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Washington."
(See 2d OSC Resp. at 3.) The court does not reach
Mr. Young's request to transfer, because Mr. Young has
not satisfied the court that it has subject matter
jurisdiction in the first instance. See Rosales, 824
F.2d at 803 n.4 (holding that if a federal court determines
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction at any time during
a dispute, the court must dismiss the action).
Young has had several opportunities to properly assert
subject matter jurisdiction. (See Compl. (Dkt. # 1);
OSC Resp.; 2d OSC Resp.) Still, he has not asserted
sufficient facts for the court to conclude that it has either
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although
Mr. Young cites a federal statute as the basis of his Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") claim, he
has not alleged facts sufficient for the court to conclude
that his claim arises under that statute.
Mr. Young's repeated failures to properly assert subject
matter jurisdiction, he appears to make a good-faith effort
by (mistakenly) asserting the citizenships of Ditech's
directors. Considering Mr. Young's pro se
status, and his apparently good-faith efforts, the court will
afford Mr. Young one final opportunity to properly assert the
citizenships of each and every Ditech member, and to allege
specific facts establishing that his purported FDCPA claim
arises under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
the court ORDERS Mr. Young to file a written response to this
order within 14 days that (1) asserts the citizenship of each
and every Ditech member, and (2) alleges specific facts
establishing that his purported FDCPA claim arises under 15
U.S.C. § 1692e, Mr. Young is instructed to limit his
response to this order to the sole question of jurisdiction,
and refrain from making requests to transfer or seeking any
further relief from the court until the court has determined
it has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. If Mr.
Young fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction after
what will now be Mr. Young's fourth opportunity, the
court will dismiss his complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. If the court does so, it will dismiss the case
without prejudice to Mr. Young filing proper claims in a
court with jurisdiction over them.
 Additionally, Mr. Young fails to
explain how his claim under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act is a proceeding "arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title ...