United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge.
District Court has referred this action, filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to United States Magistrate Judge David
W. Christel. Presently pending before the Court is
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6)
(Dkt. 46) and Motion to Stay Discovery (“Motion to
Stay, ” Dkt. 48).
Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted in the Amended Complaint (hereinafter
“Complaint”). Therefore, the Court grants the
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 46), but gives Plaintiff leave to
file an amended complaint. The Court defers ruling on the
issue of qualified immunity. Plaintiff must file an amended
complaint on or before February 13, 2020. The Court also
grants the Motion to Stay (Dkt. 48) and all discovery is
stayed until the Court enters an order lifting the stay.
Kyntrel Trevyone Jackson was housed at Clallam Bay
Corrections Center (“CBCC”) between February 2019
and June 2019 and then transferred to Washington Corrections
Center (“WCC”) on June 12, 2019. Dkt. 10.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Plaintiff's
constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and several state and federal criminal statutes.
Dkt. 10. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants
retaliated against Plaintiff for filing “legal
bankruptcy” actions against Defendant Romero, and
Defendants denied Plaintiff due process when he was
transferred from CBCC to WCC and placed in isolation.
Id. at 11.
filed their Motion to Dismiss on November 22, 2019. Dkt. 46.
Plaintiff filed a Response, Defendants filed a Reply, and
Plaintiff filed a Surreply. Dkt. 49, 52, 53. Defendants also
filed a Motion to Stay Discovery on November 25, 2019. Dkt.
48. Plaintiff filed a Response and Defendants filed a reply.
Dkt. 50, 51. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
Defendants did not object to the Surreply, the Court also
considered Plaintiff's Surreply in ruling on the Motions.
February 2019, Plaintiff alleges he was transferred to the
Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”) at CBCC for his
protection. Dkt. 10 at 11, 57, 58; Dkt. 49 at 14. While
housed in IMU, in April 2019, Plaintiff alleges he began
taking “legal bankruptcy” actions against CBCC
psychology associate, Defendant Heidi Romero, by sending her
several letters, affidavits, and notices. Dkt. 10 at 11.
letters, Plaintiff attempts to assert bankruptcy against
Defendant Romero and states he is billing Defendant Romero
for the damages she caused. Dkt. 10 at 11, 20. On April 28,
2019, Plaintiff sent a letter alleging Defendant Romero owes
Plaintiff $765, 000 in damages. Dkt. 10 at 11, 21.
Plaintiff's letter states Defendant Romero has thirty
days to pay the debt in full, or Plaintiff will enter an
affidavit of foreclosure, and Plaintiff will be forced to
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Defendant
Romero. Dkt. 10 at 11, 21.
sent another letter on May 27, 2019, reiterating Defendant
Romero's debt to Plaintiff and stating Defendant Romero
must provide Plaintiff with all her personal property before
he files foreclosure and a lien against her. Dkt. 10 at 11,
29. On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff sent an invoice to Defendant
Romero, now stating she had incurred a debt of over $1
million. Dkt. 10 at 11, 35-38. On June 9, 2019, Plaintiff
sent a third letter stating Defendant Romero is in
foreclosure and Plaintiff was forcing her into involuntary
bankruptcy because she refused to pay her debt. Dkt. 10 at
6, 2019, Plaintiff alleges a meeting was held by Defendants
Irving, Brady, Bannan, Romero, Gillespie, Dittman, Long, and
Carr wherein they decided Plaintiff's actions were a
threat to the security of CBCC IMU, and Plaintiff was fixated
on and harassing a CBCC staff member. Dkt. 10 at 11, 57-58.
Plaintiff was transferred to WCC on June 12, 2019. Dkt. 10 at
12, 58. Plaintiff was placed in isolation at WCC. Dkt. 10 at
Standard of Review
motion to dismiss can be granted only if Plaintiff's
Complaint, with all factual allegations accepted as true,
fails to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level”. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570).
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts
are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, et al.,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal citations omitted). However,
the pleading must be more than an “unadorned,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
the Court must accept all the allegations contained in a
complaint as true, the Court does not have to accept a
“legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.;
Jones v. Community Development Agency, 733 F.2d 646,
649 (9th Cir. 1984) (vague and mere conclusory allegations
unsupported by facts are not sufficient to state section 1983
claims); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th
Cir. 1992). While the Court is to construe a complaint
liberally, such construction “may not supply essential
elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”
Pena, 976 F.2d at 471.
as here, exhibits are attached to a complaint, the exhibits
are deemed part of the complaint for all purposes, including
for purposes of determining the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); 5A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 3d § 1327, at 443-44 (2002). Moreover, if an
exhibit attached to a complaint contradicts an assertion in
the complaint and reveals information that prohibits recovery
as a matter of law, the information provided in the exhibit
trumps the allegation in the complaint. Wilson v.
Fitter, 2009 WL 6908049, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009)
report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3893992
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (citing Riggins v.
Walter, 279 F.3d 422, 425-26 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming
dismissal of prisoner's § 1983 claims where
information in attached exhibit contradicted allegation of
complaint); Hudson v. Phillipson, 2008 WL 356884, *3
(W.D.Mich. Feb.7, 2008) (dismissing prisoner's §
1983 claims where information in attached exhibits conflicted
with allegations of complaint)).